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Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF iDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

f.U- :Jv../)!I - 31 ?

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

SUSAN E. WJEBE
District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION:
1.

Petitioner, Ernesto Gutierrez Medina is presently incarcerated in the Northwest

Detention Facility in Tacoma, Washington in the custody of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") pending removal from the United States to Mexico.

2.

On June 16, 1997, the District Court for the Third Judicial District in the State of

Idaho, Payette County, the Honorable Stephen Drescher presiding ("district court") entered an
amended judgment of conviction and commitment and order of probation decreeing that Mr.

I
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Medina was guilty of Delivery of a Controlled Substance in violation of I.C. § 37-2732 in Payette
County District Court. The number for that case is CR-FE-1996-555 (the "delivery case").
3.

On June 6, 1997, the district court sentenced Medina to a unified term of five

years with a minimum period of confinement of two and one half years. The district court

suspended Mr. Medina's sentence and placed him on probation for a period of five years. As a
condition of probation, the district court imposed 360 days of jail, ordered that 180 of those days

be served at the discretion of the probation officer and gave Mr. Medina credit for 97 days
already served. The district court ordered that Mr. Medina could complete the remaining days in
the work release program.

4.

The district court adjudged
Mr. Medina -guilty after an Alford ....nlea-- entered
....
--- ---- on
- -,,-

-

-

~

~-

April 15, 1997.
5.

Mr. Medina did not appeal his judgment of conviction.

6.

On August 11, 1997, Mr. Medina filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule

35 asking that his jail sentence be commuted to time-served as INS had placed a hold on him and
he was unable to participate in the work release program as anticipated. The district court
granted this motion on August 17, 1997.
7.

Mr. Medina has not fi1ed any petitions for habeas corpus in state or federal court

or any other petitions, motions or applications in this or any other court with respect to this
judgment of conviction.

II.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
8.

Mr. Medina married Maria de Ia Luz ("Luz") in 1986. The couple has four

children ranging in ages from eleven to twenty-four years of age; The couple's oldest son,
2
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I

Ernesto Junior ("Junior'') and their youngest son. Ulisses, are legal permenent residents of the
United States. Mr. Medina's two middle children - Yesenia and Albert-· are United States
citizens.
9.

Mr. Medina- a citizen of Mexico - lawfully entered the United States as a worker

in 1986. In December 1990, Mr. Medina became a legal permanent resident and was given a
green card that expired in 2001. A true and correct copy of Mr. Medina's· green card is attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
10.

Since arriving in the United States, Mr. Medina and his family resided in the

Ontario, Oregon area. Mr. Medina's oldest three children graduated from local high schools and
his youngest son is presently enrolled in a local school The older children remain in the area.
Junior and Yesenia are attending college and Albert has given Mr. Medina a grandchild.
11.

In June 1995, Mr. Medina was arrested and accused of delivery of a controlled

substance. Mr. Medina neither possessed the drugs at issue nor delivered them. The Payette

County case number assigned to that case was CR-1995-444.
12.

Luz suffers from a psychotic disorder. Stress exacerbates the symptoms of Luz's

illness and she reacted very poorly to Ernesto's incarceration. On August 23, 1995, Luz was
hospitalized for her mental illness. True and correct copies of Luz• s mental health records are
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
13.

In September 1995, case nwnber CR-1995-444 was dismissed.

14.

In March 1996, the delivery case was filed based on the same allegation that was

at issue in the dismissed case, CR-1995-444. Mr. Medina was arrested in the delivery case in
August 1996.
3
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15.

Mr. Medina was represented in the delivery case by Mr. David Lee Posey.

16.

Following Mr. Medina's arrest in the delivery case, Luz again had a great deal of

difficulty coping with Mr. Medina's incarceration. Mr. Medina desperately wanted out of jail so

that he could continue working and caring for his wife and children. Mr. Medina posted a bail
bond on November 13, 1996.
17.

After being released from jail, Luz continued to worry that Mr. Medina would

have to return to jail, which caused her anxiety and depression.
l &.

As important as it was to remain out of jail, it was even more critical for Mr.

Medina to keep his green card so he could continue living in the area and ca.ring for his family.
Mr. Medina was very proud of the fact that he had no criminal history and he believed
maintaining a clean record was important to his immigration status. Therefore, on three
occasions, Mr. Medina asked Mr. Posey if accepting a plea agreement would effect his
immigration status. On each occasion~ Mr. Posey assured Mr. Medina that the plea agreement
and sentence would not effect his green card and that he could remove the conviction from his
record after 3 months.
19.

Mr. Medina entered a written plea agreement with the state whereby he would

enter an Alford plea to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. Pursuant to the Alford
plea, Mr. Medina did not admit guilt but agreed there was evidence upon which a jury could find
him guilty of the crime. The agreement indicated that Mr. Medina would be placed on probation
for a period of five years and that as a condition of probation, he serve 360 days of jail. The
agreement indicated that 180 of those days would be suspended and serv~ at the discretion of
the probation officer. The agreement further provided that Mr. Medina would receive credit for
4
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97 days already served and that the remaining 83 days would be served with work privileges.
The executed plea agreement was filed with the district court on April 11, 1997.
20.

Mr. Medina relied on Mr. Posey's advice that the plea agreement would not effect

his immigration status in deciding to enter that agreement. Maintaining his immigration status
was more important to Mr. Medina than the length of any incarceration or other punishment
associated with the conviction. Had Mr. Medina known that the plea agreement would subject
him to deportation, he would not have entered it or negotiated a plea agreement that ameliorated
the immigration consequences.
21.

The district court accepted Mr. Medina's Alford plea pursuant to this agreement

on April 15, 1997.
22.

On June 6, 1997, the district court sentenced Mr. Medina in accordance with the

plea agreement. The district court ordered Mr. Medina to report for his jail time on July 8, 1997
and to complete all rehabilitative programs required by his probation officer.
23.

It was the understanding of the district court and the parties that Mr. Medina

would participate in work release, participate in rehabilitative programs and complete probation
while residing in Oregon.
24.

On July 25, 1997, Mr. Medina was served with a notice to appear issued by INS

that alleged he was subject to removal from the United States based on the conviction in the
delivery case. A true and correct copy of this notice is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
25.

On November 19, 1997, Mr. Medina was deported to Mexico via Nogales on foot.

A true and correct copy of the order and notice ofremoval is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Mr.

5
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Medina was very confused by the immigration proceedings and did not have a clear
understanding of their outcome.
26.

INS left Mr. Medina's green card in his possession, which indicated it expired in

2001. Because INS did not take the green card from Mr. Medina, he believed it must still be
effective. Mr. Medina presented the green card at the border when he returned to the United
States and was allowed to enter.
27.

In 2000, Mr. Medina begin to suspect the green card was no longer good and he

was afraid to apply to renew it. However, Mr. Medina still did not clearly understand the
outcome of the 1997 immigration proceedings or the impact of the conviction in the delivery case
on his ability to renew his green card,
28.

In September 201 O~ ICE arrested Mr. Medina for being in the United States

unlawfully. Thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon charged Mr.
Medina with Reentry of Deported Alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § l326(a), a felony. The case
was called: USA v. Medina-Gutierrez~ 3:1 O-cr-00389-MA (the ''re-entry case").
29.

Mr. Medina pled guilty to Illegal Entry by Eluding Examination and Inspection by

Immigration Officers, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 167 days of incarceration. Mr.
Medina served that sentence in the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Sheridan, Oregon,
which was completed on or about March 11, 2011. Mr. Medina is presently in ICE's custody in
Tacoma, Washington pending removal from the United States.
30.

During consultation with attorneys following the re-entry case, Mr. Medina

discovered that the conviction in the delivery case is considered an aggravated felony that renders
him ineligible for any type of relief from deportation under current immigration laws. In March
6
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2011, Mr. Medina discovered that if he had entered a guilty plea before April 1, 1997, he could
have been eligible for relief from deportation under the prior version of the law. See lN.S. v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that discretionary relief from deportation available before
amendments to immigration laws that became effective in April 1997 remains available for

aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those
convictions, would have been eligible for that relief at the time of their plea under the law then in
effect).

31.

Additional affidavits, records and other evidence are being prepared in support of

the instant Petition and will be filed as soon as they become available.
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Received Ineffective J\.!i!sistance of Counsel

32.

Mr. Medina re-alleges Paragraphs l to 30 as if fully set forth herein.

33.

By informing Mr. Medina that his Alford plea would not impact his green card,

Mr. Posey provided affirmatively incorrect advice, which Mr. Medina relied on in deciding to
enter the plea.
34.

Upon Mr. Medina, s inquiry as to whether there would be an immigration

consequence to his plea, Mr. Posey had an obligation to either research the potential inunigration
consequences or advise Mr. Medina that he did not know the potential impact and recommend
that he seek the advice of an immigration attorney. By instead providing materially incorrect
advice, Mr.
35.

Posey~s

assistance fell below an objective level of competence.

The law indicating that Mr. Medina would be subject to automatic removal from

the United States based on the conviction in the delivery case was straightforward and succinct.

7

• VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

q

Mar 23 2.011

2:25PM Nevin, Benjamin,

36.

pa

"Y' B 208345827 4

Had Mr. Medina known that he would be deported and ineligible to return to the

United States, he would not have entered an Alford plea and would have insisted on going to
trial.

37.

Had Mr. Medina or Mr. Posey been aware of the status of immigration law at the

time of the delivery case, Mr. Medina could have negotiated a plea that did not carry such
profound immigration consequences and/or entered a plea prior to the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), thereby preserving Mr. Medina' g eligibility for
discretionary relief from deportation.
3K

By informing Mr. Medina that his plea in the delivery case would not effect his

status as a legal permanent resident, Mr. Posey performed deficiently within the meaning of

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
39.

Mr. Medina was prejudiced by Mr. Posey's deficient performance.

40.

Mr. Medina was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13

of the Idaho Constitution.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief:
A. That the conviction be vacated.
Respectfully submitted this

23

day of

/f):i1 C~

'2011.

~cKAY &BARTLETTLLP

Attorneys for Petitioner
8
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VERIFICATION OF APPLICANT THROUGH COUNSEL
STATE OF IDAHO
SS.

COUNTY OF ADA
I, Robyn Fyffe, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say:
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.
2. That I am appearing as counsel of record for the Petitioner in the above-captioned
case.
3 .. That I am able to converse in the Spanish language.
4. That I drafted the foregoing Petition based on information that Mr. Medina provided to
me in telephone calls during his incarceration at the FCI Sheridan and Northwest Detention
Facility and based on my review of documents in the delivery case, the re-entry case and
immigration case.
5. I have reviewed the contents of this Petition with Mr. Medina by telephone and he
affirmed that the contents therein within his personal knowledge are true i;illd correct.
6. I have mailed the foregoing Petition in order to obtain Mr. Medina~s notarized
signature. However, I anticipate it will be several days to weeks before the signed petition
arrives via U.S. mail.
7. Mr. Medina is subject to removal from this country until the instant request for post~
conviction relief is granted and I am filing the Petition prior to receipt of the signed copy to
prevent further delay in the proceedings.
~

Robyn Fyffe
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VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER

STATE OF WASHINGTON
SS.

COUNTY OF~~~~I, Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, being duly sworn upon my oath. depose and say that I have
subscribed to the foregoing petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and
allegations therein set forth are true.

Ernesto G. Medina

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

day of - - - - - -, 2011.

Notary Public for Wasbington
My commission expires: _ __
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIF_J.That on this23day of
and correct copy of the

(JJ~ c/k.

going document to be:

faxed
hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661

Robyn Fyffe
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INDIVIDUAL.
PROGRESS NOTE MARIA MEDINA
1 HOUR
l/27/97
I have spoke with Vicky regarding Maria Medina1s progress. She has been doing much
better. She reports that her appetite continues to be good. She says she is sleeping well,
concentration is good and her sexual relations with her husband are without problems. She denies
having any symptoms of depression for some time. However, she is experiencing some
anxiousness at the thought of her husband possibly going to jail again, and fearing she may get
sick as she was in the past. She also admits to crying on occasion when she thinks about this
situation.
It appears Maria suffers a schizo affective disorder. depressive type. Her decompensation
was precipitated by the arrest of her husband and fear that· something bad was going to happen to
her and the children. Her psychosis is in remission. However, now that she is beginning to think
about her husband possibly returning to jail, she is experiencing feelings of anxiousness. She
reports not having any previous episodes of psychotic symptoms. However, she does recall an
incident in 1985 at the age of25. At that time she experienced convulsions as a result of a high
fever. She tends to have strong reactions to high stress situations. She recalls very little of the
incident that landed her in the hospital.
Maria bas been taking her medications regularly,. and reports being compliant with her
treatment regime. She is asking how long does she have to take the medicine. An Appointment
has been set to see Dr. Hoopes...3/3/97 at .11 :00. She will contact Blanca from OHR to assist her.
/ I /}//

Al Sanchez, MSW

r7

~~-

2/3/97 PROGRESS NOTE INDkUAL
1 HOUR
MENTALHEALTH
Met with Maria. Reviewed mental status. Overall continues to be stable, but is still
worried about the situation with her husband's legal problems. Mr. Ernesto Medina (husband)
accompanied Maria. He shared his perceptions that Maria is doing well, and has been for some
time. Al.so, confirmed that as she begins to think about the possible jail situation) she 8eems more
anxi01JS and depressed. ~~vezxtek

Al Sanchez, M.S.W.

tiJ;t',tu,

2/3/97 PROGRESS NOTE IND
UAL
1 HOUR
MENTAL HEALTH
Met with Maria. Reviewed mental status. Overall continues to be stable, but is still
worried about the situation with her husband's legal problems. Mr. Ernesto Medina (husband)
accompanied Maria. He shared his perceptions that Maria is doing well, and has been for some
time. Also,. confirmed that as she begins to think about the possible jail situation, she seems m-0re
anxious and depressed.
next _;veek:.

f dJ7

Al Sanchez, M.S.W.

~,:Uv~

.

2/17/97
PROGRESS NOTE I HOUR
INDIVIDUAL
MENTAL HEALTH
Maria describes a situation with her husband this past week, where he came home late
from visiting a friend. She became anxious and upset, and worried that something happened. She
describes feelings o~tighs and1reure in her chest.
d,d/~
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U.S. Deparlmenl of Justice

?O

Notice to .Appear

Iminigralion and Naturalization Senice

Jn removal :proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
File No:

A.90 623 722

In the Matter 01:

'Respondent:

~

Ernesto MEDINA-Gutienez

currently relJidinf at:

c/O USIN&S Custody; 4620 Overland Rm 11108; Boise, ID 83705

(208) 334-1824

D I. You axe an arrivill.g alien.
0 2. You are an alien present in the Onited States who has not been admitted or paroled.
m 3. You h.ave been admitted to the United Slates. but are deporlable for the reasons staled below.
Tb.e Servfoe alleges lhat you:

Cp . Are !l.ot ~ eitizell or national of the United stales:
Pf 2. Are a native Gf
Mexico

·~

and a citizen of_ _.,,..M_e,x.,..i...,c...o.___ _ _ __
1{3. WeTe admitted to ~he United States at Porland, OR on or about December 1, 1990 as a
S26,' Special Agricultural Worker;

pr;.
.

Were, on June 10, 1997, convicted in the District Court of the Third Judicia1,District
of the State cf Idaho, in and for the County of Payette, for th.e offense of DELIVERY
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732 (Felony).

On~;s:\~4 foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United Slates pursuant to the following

~olimon(a}ot;:/:

.

.

" jiction 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), as amended, in tha~
any time aiter admission, you have been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in
ection l01(a)(43) of the Act.

CJ 'J'his notice is being issued alter an asylum officer has found th.at \be respondent has demonstrated a credible iear of

persecution.

a

Section Z!Ul(li}(t} order -.as vacated pursuant to: C 8 CFR 208.30(!}(2)

C 6 CTR 235.3(b)(5}(iv)

YOU ARE ORDERED to appear before an immigration judge of the Ullited Stales Department of Jusii~e at: TO BE DETERMINED

OD------the
(D~rl

oharge(s) ael forlh above.

{Co:m111tl• Mdn• qf ~ Cwrl.lDdudm.( Boom Jlwm. f1 JDJ)

al

lo shoY why you should no

mo'Ved from ~he United Slates based on
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Notice to Respondent
Taming: Any statement you make may be wred against 'you in removal proceedings.

Alien Registration: Tim copy of the Notice to Appear served upon you is evidence of your alien registration while you are under
removal proceedhlg$. You are required to carry it with you a1 all limes.
.
Representation: If you so choose, you may be represented in this proceeding,_ at no e:xp_~n.se to tlle'Go:;~enl. by an a.ltome!
or other lndi:vidual authorized and qualified to r~resent persons oefore the"1.:lecutive Office for ImmiW:aliG'Ilf,Review, purauanl lo
a CFR 3.16.. Unless you so request. no hearing will. be scheituled earlier than ten days from the date of thls ndtfoe. to allow you
sufficient time la secure counsel. AliHt of qualified aUorneys and organizations wlio may be available to represent you at no
eost will be provided wiih this Notice.
Conduct of the hearing: At the lime of your hearing, you should bring with you any affidavits or other documents which you
desire to b.ave considered iD. connectioq with your case Ii any document is in a foreign language. JQU rnurl bring the onginal
and a certified English tra:nslalion Qf the dQcument. Il you wish to have the leslimony of any witnesses considered. y1Ju Should
arTange to have su:c.h witnes:Jes present at the ,hearing.
Al your bea.rlng Y.OU will be ~en the op_portunity to admit or deny any or all of lhe aJI_e.,gationB in the Notice lo Appear and that
yoµ are inadmasible or de:g9rtable on. the eharg.es contained in tlie Notfae to Appear. Ynu :'ill have an op:gortuDity to prinent
eV!dence on your own behlill. lo examme any imde:nce presented bJ the Government. to ob1ect. ou proper legal gr:ounds. to the
receipt of evidence and t'Q oross examine any 'Witnesses presented by lhe Government. .Al the conclusion of your :hearing, you
have a right to appeal an adverse decision. by the immigration judge.
V(?U, will.be adyised by~~ immjgration.iudge before.whom you appe~, of any relief lroJJ,J remo~al for which you may app~ar.
eligible. mcludme lh~ pnvilege o! depatfmg voluntarily. You will lie given a reasonable opporluruty to make any sueli applioabon

lo the unmigrallon }Udge.
.
failure lq aP,pear: Yo'}J ar~ required lo pro:Jide the IN~. iD. 'Writing with your full mailing address and telephone number. You
mu~ notify tne ImmIU~hon Cour~ imJRed1at~JY.. by us~g ~orw. Eol:R-33 '1!4~~e~er you..c~!UJ.ge iqur a~dres.~, qr tele~h9:rie nuJnber
dunng the course cf ibis proceedmg. You "llill be ~rov1ded wn11 a copy or IDlS iorm. Nonces oi D.ea:rmg Wlll oe IOW!ea io lJllS
address. If you do not submit form EOffi-33 and ao not otherwise pro~de an addres:s at 'Which you may be reached during
:proceedirl.gs. then the Government shall not be required lo provide you with written. notice of your hearmg. If you fail to attend
the !:tearin1t at tile tjme and 1'1aoe d~~ated on tfils notice, or any date and time lat.er directed by the migration Court, a
removal oroer may be made 'by the unmigration judge in your absence, and you may be arrested and detainee! by the lNS.

Request for PTompl Heanng
,To expedite a determ.it:lation in ml case. I request an immediate hearing. I waive my right to have a JO'.... day period
. appearing before an immigration Judge.
'

prior lo
.

kdr~4

~' .•

i

i

(bb1re of lhsponitnL)

I

Certificate of Service
'J'his Notice lo Appear was served on the nS)londent by me on
compliance with section 239(a)(1)(F) of the Act:

'1 \'&S ~91

0 by oerti1ied mail. return re~eipt requested

(Dale)

t

in the followin~ manner and in

t:l by regular mail

~dis a llirt of organizations and attorneys which provide iree legal services.
~alien 11~ provided oral notice in the ~\)\ \[)
language Qf th~ time and place of his or her

bearing and of the eon.sequen.oes of failure to appear as provided in section 24.0(b)(7) of the 'Aqi .

.-AF~
?JZ1-'~- ,_,_ .~-·~--_,.,,~~---'--·,---·--,·---.- ~.o:::,.....,
---t71 ~ '"",-t . z 11
- - -- - - .
~~
s-Y:'::.:???ir'r&": v .:.h\
.~tint.ti Blll!R~llll IUraalb
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&mt.e

i

_,_%

____

- -·-
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Warrant of RemovaJ/Deportation

File No: 90 623 722
Date: November 19, 1997
To any officer of the United states Immigration and Naturalization Service:
MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto
(Full name ()f alien)

who entered the United States at

Portland, OR

~~~~-...~~la-ce-o~f~en~tey_,,...j~~......--~

December 1, 1990

on

(bate Of entry)

is subject to removal/deportation from the United States, based upon a final order by:

¥

an immigration judge .in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings

O

a district director or a d:isttist director'$ designated official

O

the Board oflnnnigration Appeals

D

a United Stat~ District or Magistrate Court Judge

and pursuant to the following provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Section 237 (aX2)(AXiii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

I

I

(Signature of INS official)

District Director
(Title of INS official)

November 19, 1997 Eloy, Arizona
(Dafo and Omce location)
1-20$ {Rev 4-l-9?)N

'•-'--<~··

_ . ._._,...,_ ____________ .._

~
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U••S. Depariment ofJuslico
Immigration and NnturaUution Service

Warrant of RemovalJDeportation

To be completed by Service officer executing the warrant:
Name of alien being removed:
MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto

Port, date, and manner of removal:

'.~:i~1ftf.~i:~:f'
....,~,-..-~·""';;~:.-.

Photograph of alien

_

__..

x fingerprint
of alien removed

removed

tie ofJNS official)

If actual departure is not witnessed, fully identify source or means of verification of departure

ursuant to 8 CFR 241.7, check here.

(J~A.1'- £----?~

0

'tt-:~~~~-<._,;""'-:-o=-:·=:V.;:.Z"!::-~:::----------------

Departure verified byH·

page
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FIL·ED

•j mRD JUO!CIAL D!STR!Ci 000R?
Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@,nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

l
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Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE
COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

)
Respondent.

)

Ernesto Gutierrez Medina asks this Court, pursuant to IRE 20l(d)~ to take judicial notice of the
following adjudicative facts:
1. The files and records in the case of State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County District Court
Number CR-1995-444.
2. The files and records in the case of State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County District Court
Number CR~1996-555.

1

.. PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

ORIGINAL

...... ~

--

- - · .................. ., ... ,

Dated this

..... ._.,) .... ''"''I

;!')y

I

, . _ , ,...

JI

day of

i...,.r

c... .....

._._-r..., ..... i : . . . t - r

{Y)a/1 c {/J

'2011.

NE~VIN,
BENJAMIN, M:KAY & BARTLEIT LLP
By~-++-+---~~~~~~~~~~

Ro~

Attorneys for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on

thls·:Z~ay of ,IY/at [t1

2011, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing docwnent to be:

~--·
faxed

hand delivered

to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661

2

•PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT cmm:r
Payette
Idaho

ANNE-MARIE KELSO
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105
Payette, ID 83661
(208) 642-6096
(208) 642-6099 facsimile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO.: CV
I

)Ol l- 2 ,J7
oJ

!

t.,./

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through, Anne-Marie Kelso, Attorney for the
State of Idaho, and answers the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Petition" herein) filed with
the Court as follows:
I.

GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST -CONVICTION
ALLEGATIONS
All allegations made by Petitioner are denied by the state unless specifically
admitted herein.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF l

II.

SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION
ALLEGATIONS
1.

Answering paragraphs 2 through 6 of Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction
Relief, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein (admit the facts such
as Petitioner was convicted of the crime, he appealed, etc.)

2. Answering paragraph 13 and 14, it appears a case was filed in June 27, 1995 and
dismissed on September 28, 1995. However, according to the Idaho Repository,
the case which was filed March 5, 1996 (the subject of the instant action) shows a
violation date of March 5, 1996 and the case filed on June 27, 1995 (the dismissed
charge) shows a violation date of June 27, 1995.
3. Answering paragraph 7 (that Petitioner has not filed any prior petitions for postconviction relief or petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state or federal court,
Respondent believes this allegation to be true, but specifically reserves the right to
raise a successive petitionJres judicata/procedural default bar or defense should
facts come to light indicating that the allegation is in any party false.
4. Answering paragraphs 32-40, assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
State denies the allegation.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901 (a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 2

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal,
the claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b).
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner has failed to file his/ petition within the one year statute of
limitation and the claims are now time-barred. Idaho Code § 19-4902(a). The
Petitioner filed a Motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 on August 11, 1997. The
Court entered its order on August 15, 1997. The Defendant then had forty two days to
appeal the conviction, said appeal expiring on September 26, 1997. The Petitioner
then had one year to file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, which would make the
statute of limitations expire on September 25, 1998.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner has failed to verify his petition as required by Idaho Code §§ 194902(a) and 19-4903.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, therefore fails to
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 194906.
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:
1. That Petitioner's claims for post conviction relief be denied;

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 3

2. That Petitioner's claims for post conviction relief be summarily dismissed;
and
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case.

Dated this

5th

day of April, 2011.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of April, 2011, I delivered a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to the
person(s) indicated:
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

Hand Delivery

D

U.S. Mail ~
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FILED
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Paveth~
C~n11"<f11 t..-tnt-.. .....
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l THlRD JUD!C!AL D!S.'TP.• !CT COURT
~

VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER
STATE OF WASHINGTON
c01mTY

o/s

IUC<.:lU

I AP I< 1 'l 201'1
I -------:--_-- · - ------P.M.

L~~~ ~R::~E:~

·

J

I, Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have-subscribed to the foregoing petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and
allegations therein set forth are true.

Ernesto G. Medina

SUB:~D AND SWORN TO before me this

·1rday of ___,____
,,,jJ

tft// ;ik--Notary Public for Washington
My commission expires: ·?- n~,,,~

10
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,

2011.

f

ANNE-MARIE KELSO.
Payette County Prosechting An;om:1e,y
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105
Payette, ID 83661
(208) 642-6096
(208) 642-6099 facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

State of Idaho

CASE NO.: CV 2011-319
AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARIE KELSO
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)
SS

County of Payette

)

Anne Marie Kelso, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
says:
1. I am the Prosecuting Attorney for Payette County, Idaho.
2. Attached hereto, and incorporated

Dated this 2

nd

AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARIE KELSO 1
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r

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this
~IL

()"._

-~'1", Sa, to

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
U r [Du('
l)'YL,,
My Commission Expires: 'JIL~/ W\'\'

f<\lt \h{

AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE-MARJE KELSO 2

~d

r!/;

day of

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 2011, I delivered a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to
the person( s) indicated:
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
3 03 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
345-8274
Hand Delivery

D

U.S. Mail ~
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Case
Payette
3 Cases Found.
Ernesto Gutierrez Medina, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Post
Susan E
Case:CV-2011-0000319 District
Filed 03/23/2011 Subtype: Conviction Judge: Wiebe
Status Pending
Relief
Subjects: Medina, Ernesto Gutierrez
Other Parties:State Of Idaho Post Conviction Relief
Register Date
of
actions:
03/23/2011 New Case Filed - Post Conviction Releif
Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings Paid by: Nevin,
03/23/2011 Benjamin Receipt number: 0003047 Dated: 3/23/2011 Amount:
$.00 (Cash) For: Medina, Ernesto Gutierrez (subject)
Other party: State Of Idaho Post Conviction Relief Appearance
0312312011
Anne Mane Kelso
03/23/2011 Subject: Medina, Ernesto Gutierrez Appearance Robyn Fyffe
03/23/2011 Petitioner's Request that the Court take Judicial Notice
04/05/2011 Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
04/14/2011 Verification of Petitioner

State of Idaho vs. Ernesto Gutierrez Medina
No hearings scheduled
i'Case: CR-1996-0000555
Violation
' Charges: Date

District

Judge:

~~=~~

Charge

03/05/1996 137-2732(A)(1 )(A)-DEL
Controlled Substancedelivery
Arresting Officer: Payette
Sheriff, (PCSO), 3000

Register
of
Date
actions:
03/05/1996
03/05/1996
03/05/1996
07/29/1996
07/29/1996
07/29/1996
08/09/1996
08/09/1996
08/09/1996
08/09/1996
08/09/1996

E

Amdo~ent$8, 166.14

Closed pending clerk action

Citation Disposition
Finding: Pied
Disposition
date: 06/06/1997
Fines/fees: $841.50
Jail: 12 months
Suspended Jail: 6
months
Det Penitentiary: 6
months, 2 years
lndet Penitentiary: 6
months, 2 years
Probation: 5 years

New Case Filed
Affidavit Of Probable Cause
Warrant Issued - Arrest
Duplicate Warrant Issued 7/29/96 To Replace
Original Which Was Lost.
Duplicate Quashed/original Found
Warrant Returned
Constitutional Rights Warning
Arraignment I First Appearance
Commitment - Held To Answer
Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (08/22/1996) William B. Dillon Iii
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08/09/1996 08/22/1996
08/22/1996 Continued - Preliminary
08/22/1996 Affidavit Of Indigence
08/22/1996 Order Appointing Public Defender
08/22/1996 Court Minutes
0812211996

H.. earing Scheduled - Cont Prelim. (08/30/1996) William B. Dillon
1II

08/22/1996 08/30/1996
08/23/1996 Subpoena Returned (almarez)
08/26/1996 Request For Discovery
08/26/1996 Request For Discovery
08/29/1996 Subpoena Returned(shuler/walthall/ci95c544)
08/30/1996 Order Appointing Public Defender
08/30/1996 Continued - Cont Prelim.
08/30/1996 Court Minutes
09/03/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Cont. Prel. Hrg (09/09/1996) Judge Cherin
09/03/1996 Cont. Prelim. Hrg
09/03/1996 Change Assigned Judge
09/06/1996 Affidavit Of Atty. Fees & Costs
09/06/1996 Magistrate's Approval - For Atty. Fees
09/06/1996 Substitution Of Counsel
09/06/1996 Notice Of Appearance
09/06/1996 Waiver Of Time Limit On Setting Preliminary
09/10/1996 Change Assigned Judge
09/10/1996 Continued - Cont. Prel. Hrg
09/10/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Cont. Prelimi. (09/20/1996) James C. Peart
09/10/1996 Prelim. On 9/20/96
09/11/1996 Order For Payment Of Attys Fees & Costs
09/20/1996 Hearing Waived - Cont. Prelimi.
09/20/1996 Order Binding To District Court
09/20/1996 Order Of Commitment - Bond Reduced
09/23/1996 Criminal Information
09/24/1996 Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over)
09/24/1996 Transfer In (from Idaho Court Or County)
09/24/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Arraignment (10/04/1996) Gerald L. Weston
10/04/1996 Arraignment I First Appearance
10/04/1996 Appear & Plead Not Guilty
10/04/1996 Miscellaneous
10/17/1996 Order Setting Case For Trial, Copy Attys.
10/17/1996 Frates & Posey
1011711996

Jury Trial Scheduled - Feb.4 & 5, 1997 (02/04/1997) Dennis E.
Goff

11/13/1996 Bond Posted - Surety
11/13/1996 Stipulation And Order Copies: Frates,
11 /13/1996 Posey & Sheriff
11/13/1996 Waiver Of Extradition
11/13/1996 Order To Release Copies: Birch, Posey And
11/13/1996 Sheriff
01/30/1997 Stipulation And Order To Continue Copies:
01/30/1997 Frates And Posey, Attys
01 /30/1997 Continued
01/30/1997 Jury Trial Scheduled - (04/15/1997) Dennis E. Goff
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02/03/1997 Defendant's Waiver Of Statutory Right To
02/03/1997 Speedy Trial
02/05/1997 Unavailable Dates
04/11 /1997 Rule 11 Plea Agreement
04/15/1997 Change Plea To Guilty Before H/t
0411511997

Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (06/06/1997) Stephen W.
Drescher

04/15/1997 Court Minutes
05/16/1997 Affidavit Of Restitution
06/06/1997 Notice To Defendant Upon Sentencing Copies
06/06/1997 Frates And Posey
06/06/1997 Hearing Held - Sentencing
06/06/1997 Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered
06/06/1997 Sentenced To Incarceration
06/06/1997 Probation Ordered
06/06/1997 Case Status Closed But Pending
06/06/1997 Court Minutes
06/09/1997 Bond Exonerated
06/10/1997 Judgment And Commitment & Order Of Probation
06/10/1997 On Suspended Execution Of Judgment Copies:
06/10/1997 Frates, David L. Posey, Prob, Jail
06/16/1997 Amended Judgment & Commitment & Order Of Prob
06/16/1997 On Suspended Execution Of Judgment Copies:
06/16/1997 Frates, Posey, Prob, Jail
07 /11 /1997 Amended Supplemental Judgment & Commitment
07/11/1997 And Order Of Probation On Suspended Ex07/11/1997 Cution Of Judgment Copies: Frates, Posey
07/11/1997 & Prob
08/01/1997 Stipulation And Order To Unseal Pre-sentence
08/01/1997 Report
08/01/1997 Order To Unseal Pre-sentence Report
08/11 /1997 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
08/11 /1997 Hearing Scheduled - (08/15/1997) Stephen W. Drescher
08/14/1997 Reopen (case Previously Closed)
08/15/1997 Disposition With Hearing
08/15/1997 Order On Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
08/15/1997 Frates, Posey, Sheriff, Immigration
08/15/1997 Case Status Closed But Pending
08/15/1997 Court Minutes
09/26/1997 Order Allowing Unsupervised Probation, Copies
09/26/1997 Frates, Posey, Prob
09/30/2009 Change Assigned Judge (batch process)
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record
09/15/2010 By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: public Receipt number:
0008579 Dated: 9/15/2010 Amount: $86.00 (Cash)

State of Idaho vs. Ernesto Gutierrez Medina
No hearings scheduled
.
William B
Amount
Case: CR-1995-0000444 Magistrate Judge: Dillon
due: $0.00
Closed
111
Violation
Charge
Citation Disposition
Ch arges: Date
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06/27/1995 137-2732(A)(1 )(A)-DEL
Controlled Substancedelivery
Arresting Officer: Payette
Sheriff, (PCSO), 3000
Register
of
Date
actions:
06/27 /1995
06/27/1995
06/27/1995
08/28/1995
09/01/1995
09/01 /1995
09/01/1995
09/01/1995
09/01/1995
09/05/1995
09/05/1995
09/08/1995
09/08/1995
09/11/1995
09/11 /1995
09/14/1995
09/20/1995
09/27/1995
09/28/1995
09/28/1995
10/03/1995
0512512005

't 01 't

Finding: Dismissed
By Prosecutor
Disposition
date: 09/28/1995
Fines/fees: $0.00

New Case Filed
Affidavit Of Probable Cause
Warrant Issued - Arrest
Ct Mtns From Malheur County
Warrant Returned
Arraignment I First Appearance
Constitutional Rights Warning
Order To Release 'or'
Waiver Of Extradition
Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (09/15/1995) William B. Dillon Iii
Prelim 9/15/95
Order & Motion To Continue
Continued - Preliminary
Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (09/28/1995) William B. Dillon Iii
Cont Prelim 9/28/95
Sam Almarez
Waiver Of Time
Notice Of Compliance
Dismissed Before Trial Or Hearing - Cont Prelim
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered
Subpoena Returned
STATUS CHANGED (batch process)
Connection: Public
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COllRT
Payette County, Idaho
ANNE-MARIE KELSO
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105
Payette, ID 83661
(208) 642-6096
(208) 642-6099 facsimile

._ _B_E~SSEN _ _
B Y - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - · Deput

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO.: CV 2011-319
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through Anne-Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney
for Payette County, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906, and moves for summary disposition
of Petitioner's petition for post conviction relief on the general basis that, in light of the pleadings,
answers, admissions and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition is untimely and is
barred by the statute of limitations.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 5, 1996, the Petitioner was charged with Delivery of a Controlled
Substance. On June 6, 1997, the Petitioner, having entered a plea to the charge, was
sentenced to the Delivery charge and placed on probation. An amended judgment was
filed on June 16, 1997 and yet another amended supplemental judgment was filed on

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 1

July 11, 1997. The Defendant then filed a Motion pursuant to ICR, Rule 35 and the
order on said motion was entered August 15, 1997. The last activity on the case was
September 26, 1997, when the Court released the Defendant from supervised
probation.
II.
GUTIERREZ MEDINA'S PETITION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED
Idaho Code Section 19-4902, setting forth a one year statute of limitations for
post conviction proceedings, provides in pertinent part, "[a]n application may be filed
at any time within one year from the expiration of time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceedings following an
appeal, whichever is later." The construction of such statute is a question of law over
which the court exercises free review. Freeman v. State 122 Idaho 627, 628, 839 P.2d
1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992); Hanks v. State 121Idaho153, 154, 823 P.2d 187, 188
(Ct. App. 1992). In Evensiosky v. State 136 Idaho 189, 191 (2001), the Supreme Court
reinforced the one year statute oflimitations. The Court held that I .C. § 19-4902
expressly limits a party's time to bring a claim for post-conviction review to one year.
Furthermore, the time for filing a petition for post-conviction relief begins upon either
the determination of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for the filing of an
appeal. I.C. § 19-4902. Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires appeals be filed within
forty-two (42) days of the filing of any appealable judgment, order, or decree of the
district court. In the case at bar, since there was no direct appeal, the time for filing an

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 2
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appeal expired forty two days after the order on the Motion for Rule 35 Relief, or
September 26, 1997.
Petitioner's petition was filed more than one year and forty two days from
determination of his Rule 35 Motion. Petition did not appeal any decisions of the
court. Accordingly, Petitioner's post conviction relief in barred by the statute of
limitations and should be dismissed for said~n.
Dated this 22°' day of September, 01
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 2011, I delivered a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to
the person(s) indicated:
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
345-8274
Hand Delivery

D

U.S. Mail
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IRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
County, Idaho
ANNE-MARIE KELSO
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1130 Third Avenue North, Room 105
Payette, ID 83661
(208) 642-6096
(208) 642-6099 facsimile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV 2011-319
NOTICE OF HEARING FOR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through Anne-Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney
for Payette County, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906, and gives notice that the
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition will be heard at the Payette County Courthouse,
1130 Third Avenue North, Payette, Idaho on the 4th day of November, 2011at2:00 p.m. or as

soon thereafter as may be heard.

NOTICE OF HEARING I

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 2011, I delivered a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to via the method indicated, all charges pre-paid, to
the person(s) indicated:
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
345-8274
Hand Delivery

D

U.S. Mail ~

Fac~iplile ~

r '~r
\

I

i

I~

NOTICE OF HEARING 2

ANNE-MARIE KELSO
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1130 Third Avenue North
Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
208-642-6096
Fax:208-642-6099

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) CASE NO.: CV 2011-319
)
) ORDER TO CONTINUE
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
V.

ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Defendant.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary
Dismissal scheduled for the 4th day of November, 2011, is continued to the 18th of November,
2011 at 2:00 p.m.

--T"

DATED this Q<a day of September, 2011,
j

d___ ~,w
District Judge

ORDER TO CONTINUE 1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

f~

I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method (s) indicated
below, to the person (s) listed below:
Robin Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY and BARTLETT, 303 West Bannock, P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Hand Delivery _ _

U.S. Mail_L

Facsimile - - - -

Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1130 Third Avenue North
Payette, ID 83661

Hand Delivery _ __

U.S. Mail

Facsimile

BETTY J. DRESSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

BY

ORDER TO CONTINUE 2
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FILED

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

Payette ~~nty, Idaho

NOV l O2011:!

---A.~J:'.:._..._,__P.ft4.

Y J. DRESSEN

B

, De ut

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2011-319

AFFIDA VJT OF COUNSEL

Robyn Fyffe~ being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says:
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho.
2. That I am counsel for the Petitioner, Ernesto G. Medina, in the above-entitled case.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, filed
on April 1 1, 1997 in State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County Case Number CR-FE~ I 996-555.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Court Minutes from the
sentencing hearing that occurred on June 6, 1997 in State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County Case
Number CR-FE-1996-555.

1 •

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

Nov 10 2011

2:57PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mrl-::iy, B 2083458274

page

~

5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Amended Supplemental
Judgment of Conviction, filed on July 11, 1997 in State v. Ernesto G. Medina, Payette County Case
Number CR-FE-1996-555.
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Criminal Docket in USA v.
]vfedina-Gutierrez, 3:10-cr-00389-J\1.A. Counsel obtained this copy with her PACER account from the
CM/ECF website for the United States District Court, District of Oregon.
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of the Judgment filed on December 10,
2010 in USA v. Medina-Gutierrez, 3: 1O-cr-00389-MA. The undersigned obtained this copy with her
PACER account from the CMJECF website for the United States District Court, District of Oregon.
8. On March 8, 2011, the undersigned obtained a copy of the Prosecution Report from the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement from Mr. Medina's attorney in the re·entry case. A true and
correct copy of that report is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
This ends my affidavit.

2 •
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A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this_ day of November 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be:

mailed

_x_faxed
hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
~

Robyn Fyffe

3 •
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FILED

David . Lee Posey
'· · At to};:.~ex . at Law

. . . . \iJiJlCV.L tJISIRK:T COURT
. . ,, .. it• Covrt1'f, !doho

P . o ~ ··'} Box s
i;>ayettet7i ID 83661 - 0005

, 208/6,42,;;~339
' '." .

·~

:

··'

.... ; ·.

Attorney for Defendant
Our File ' No.

96-6668

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
..
j~

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

(

STATE OF IDAHO

Case

)

N~.

CR-FE-96-00555

)

Plaintiff

)
)
)

vs.

RULE ll PLEA AGREEMENT

)
)
)
)
)

I

Lee Posey, attorney for Defendant and Gregory F.

\~~Frat~~;~,·:. att·o~ney for Plaintiff, enter into a Plea Agreem~nt

.

;~
~J.;:::~~~~1.· : ..;.<~?-< :··;_
·:..;:~ ~.. ..
:~ , _,,,,,.)':F the ":Provisions

;~~k~g,;i'..~~~;f!r

of Rule J.J.(d}

(l.} (C)

I.C.R. ·on

f

·+

;

. : /;:.~riteq:<)1n·:'Alford plea · of. guilty to the charge, of Delivery of

",~~iw[:~:~-·.:~¢onif~1iid

Defendant will withdr'!-w' his plea of, n.ot . 9rtlty

substance in violation of section 37-2732,

Ida~o

in the Criminal Information.
the Defendant be placed on probation for a period
under the standard conditions of

special condition:

That

t~~

jail with credit for 97

,

~ule .

ll Plea Agreement - 1
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Defendant serve
~ '. '

Nov 10 2011

2:58PM Nevin, Benjamin,

,.

..

•..

M,..' .. v,

B 2083458274
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I

. .. that. 'the ." probation officer believes can be c orrected by the
:_~{·:~~~~~f~:;:4:r~ ~E~\;~t: ~-i·: ·~ :~~·:~~/!I~:r}~~itf.: _
·
.·.'.·;;· : '·::·<·,~ a~rv~ce/~6~ all o r a portion of the discretionary jail- term.
The
~:f,~i;~i\.:~:-~~ ·'· Ffg:~:;-l{~J;;~c~;?;~~ii': ..·.
. .
"~~'.:·? : ' <;: Defe~~ant to serve the remaining 83 days in the Payette County
.{,~-~l ~it,h workout privileges.
;~· .

3.
.·

1

.That no additional charges will be filed against the

·~~~~ ~~~8~·Afr· for any criminal conduct involving controlled

~~.:;,~iiJuhst'aricies which the

Defendant is alleged to have committed

~ ·~~~~'1-~·:'. 'l:: . ·:. ''?~~~·· .
.
'•'-'··'"'i" :·: to his arrest in this case.

·;~~~~~*~: ~

' .:"...,.·:,'.4(.. ..;.'The Defendant

will, if requested, meet with agents for

the Idaho Criminal Bureau of Investigation and will cooperate
the involvement of other potential criminal
will have transactional immunity.
l.l,

1997.

· ·';.

~~~t~; .~~·

Rule 11 Plea Agreement - 2

. /.

f

•

.·

}jg;~~~~. ));:

Nov 1O 2011

page

3:00PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mr"-.y, B 208345827 4
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~·
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IN TaB DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDZCI:AL DISTRICT OF THE

.........

STATE OF JJ:>UO, :X:N HD FOR '1'HE COUN'l?Y OF PAYETTE

*
Presidinq:
Reporter:
Date:
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

vs

Ernesto G. Medina,
Defendant.

The Honorable Stephen
Denece Graham
June 6, 1997
)
)
)
)
)

w.

Drescher

Case No. CR-FE-96-00555*0

Court Minutes

~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~>

This beinq the time and place set for sentenoinq, present before
'·<::t;t;;,,",t,he Honorable Stephen w. Drescher were the defendant in person and
. }t~+;~',l'ly··· and through his counse1 of record David L. Posey and the state
. :;-;~)·of Idaho represented by Gregory F. Frates, Payette• County
'·\ · Prosecutinq Attorney.
Shirley Watson was certified. court
· interpreter :for the de·fendant •
.'The Court reviewed the Rule 11 plea agre~ent which had been filed
:: in· this matter and ascertained there were no corrections to the PSI
a~ditional testimony.
•
·
.The State concurred with. the recommendations of the PSI.
stipulated to Restitution in the amount of $765.00.

Counsel

Mr. Posey concurred with the PSI - sentencing shou1d be pursuant to
.the ;Rule 11 agreement. Mr. Posey col'.lcurred with the restitution
amount of $765.00 and noted the PSI was not consistent with the
Rule 11 agreement.
The Court questioned the defendant as to prior record and how the
offense took place.
:;r;if~~tih'J.'he s~ate advised the Court, the arrest record for the defendant

f:fi1,IF.'.-stemm..ed from this same charge, it had been dismissed and refiled.
/r·

·r-::~:

""

, .~

~

The court admonished the defendant, that he was trafficking in
· ;. drugs, that his substance evaluation showed he was chemically
dependent, that the defendant was not being truthfully with the
court about his involvement just as he was not truthfully about his
substance dependence.
·Based ·upon presentations of counsel, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement,
.the non presentation of the defendant and the ends of sentencing,
the court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the ISBC for a
determinate period of 2 1/2 years 'to be followed by an
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indeterminate period of 2 1/2 years for an aggregate total of five
years. The Court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
the defendant on probation for a period of five years, under the
standard terms and conditions which the cqurt delineated for the
defendant.
The standard court costs and fees were imposed, the
defendant shall made drug restitution to the State of Idaho in the
amount of $765.00.
The Court imposed 360 days in the Payette county Jail, suspended
180 days which it granted as discretionary jail time to the
defendant's probation officer.
The remaining 180 days shall be
served with work release and credit for 97 days served.
The
defendant shall report to the Payette County Jaii on July a, 1997,
at 8:00 p.m. to begin serving his jail time.
The defendant will have to work with his probation officer, as far
as his living arrangements in Oregon.
The following Other Special Conditions were imposed:
OTHER SPEC7AL CQNDXTIONS:

The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete'. any and
a11 programs of rehabilitation as required by his probation
officer.

1.

2..

The defendant shall not consume any alcohol while on· probation.

Post conviction rights were given and PSI's
Court was adjourned.
Stephen W. DreschQr, District Judge

, Clerk of the Court

COURT MINUTES

2
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STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'.t'Y OF

PAYET~E

* * *• * * * * *
THE STATE OF :IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

vs

Ernesto G. Medina,
Defendant.

)
)
)

case No.

CR-F~96-po555~D

AMENDED ~;d-.

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
AND ORDER OF PROBATION
ON SUSPENDED EXECUTION
OF JUDGMENT

on this 6th day of June, 1997, personally appeared, Gregory F.
Frates Prosecutinq Attorney for Payette County, Idaho, and the
., defendant Ernesto G,. Me4ina and the defendant's attorney David L.
Posey.
zg;a :rs ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon an a1fo.rd .
plea of quilty of the offense of Delivery of a controlled SUbstance
ac•.violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732 (Felony), committed on or

about May 4, 1995.

Tile court having asked whether the defendant had any legal cause to
show why Judgment should not be pronounced against the defenda~t,
and no sufficient cause to the contrary havihq been shown or
·appearinq to the Court,
I~

IS

ADJUDGED

that the

defendant

is quil ty as

charged and

convicted.
·:

f

:rs 1'11RTHBR ADJUDGED that the defendant. be sentenced to the
custody of the Idaho state Board of Correction {or a minimum period
of confinement of two an4 one/balt years and a subsequent;
indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed two anti one/half,):.
years, for a ~otal aggregate term of five years.
·
·
:tT

·~.AND IT IS ORDER~J> that the execution .of this Judgment be suspend~~
in compliance with Idaho Code 19-2601, Sub-Section 2·, and that the~:.;
~efendant be placed on probation under the supervision and control"
of the Idaho State Depart.J.Uent of Corrections, Probation and Parole
Division and this Court for a period of five years, commencing on
the 6th day of June, 1997 , and under the fol lowinq terms and
conditions:
r.···

That the defendant shall: (a) violate no State, Federal or
MUnicipal penal laws; (b) not change residence without first :P
obtaininq written permission from the· supervisinq officer; (cj
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submit a truthful written report to the supervising officer each
and every month and report in person when requested; (d) not leave
the state or Third Judicial District (Adams, Gem, canyon, Owyhee,
Payette and Washington counties) without first obtaining written
permission from the supervising officer; (e) seek and :maintain
employment or program approved by the supervising officer, and not
change employment or program without first obtaining written
permission from the supervising officer; (f) waives constitutional
right to be free from search and consents to the search of person,
residence, vehicle or property at request of the supervising
officer; (g) not purchase or possess any firearms or weapons; (h}
not consume or possess any controlled substances without a valid
prescription; (i) submit to a test for controlled substance· or
alcohol at probationer's ·own expense upon the request of the
supervising officer; (j) follow advice and instructions of the
supervising officer~
SPECIAL CQN'I)%TlONS

IT XS PURTHBR ORDBRBD that the defendant pay each of the sums
indicated, in the manner and on such terms as are more particularly
specified below:
COSTS (IC S31-3201A(l>) > - court costs of $17. 50 for
felony will immediately be paid to the clerk of the
court.
l.

eac~

COUR~

2.
VIC~IM'S COMPBNSATION ACCOUNT cs 72-1025) - A fine of
($25.00 (or) $50.00) per count will immediately be paid to the
clerk of the court for deposit into the crime victims'
compensation account. In addition to the $25.oo misdemeanor
and $50.00 felony reimbursement, there is a reimbursement of
not less than $200.00 per count for any conviction or finding
of guilt for any sex offense, including, but not limited to,
offenses under Sections 18-1506, 18-1507, 18-1508, 18-lSOSA,
lS-6101, 18-6101, 18-6108, l8-66D5 and 18-6608.

1993 session laws.) FOR A TOTAL OF: $50.00.

(See Ch. 278,

3. PRODATIOlf SUPBRVISZON/WORK RBLBASB RBIHBURSEMENT . _ A sum
of not more than $35.00 per month for probation supervision if
such payment is determined by the Division of Probation and
Parole of the Idaho Department of Corrections to be
appropriate. The exact amount to be paid, and the terms and
conditions of payment, will be determined by the Division of
Probation and Parole. (IC §20-255)
The County Sheriff will collect the earnings of any prisoner
on work release and deduct therefrom the cost of said
prisoner's board and personal expenses.
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION ON SUSPENDED EXECUTION
OF JUDGMENT

5~
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4.. CODlmJ:TY SD.VJ:CE FEE - A fee of $
($. 60 x number of
hours of community service) will be paid to the clerk of the
court for defendant's workers compensation coverage {IC §31-

3201C).
5.

None

VICTIM RESTITU'fJ:ON -

6..
P.O.S.'l' .. - A fee of $6.00 for deposit into the peace
officers standards and training account.

PUBLJ:C DEFENDER COSTS - The sum to be determined by
affidavit as reimbursement to the County for the expense
incurred in providing legal representation and other necessary
services. None
7.

s.

PROSECUTION COS'l'S (probationers/withheld judgments only)
condition of probation-and/or withheld judgment, the sum
of $
will be paid to the clerk of the court for the
prosecution of this criminal proceeding, to be distributed
pursuant to r.c. §19-4705.

As a

For violation of (statute), a fine of
is hereby imposed, which sum shall be paid to the clerk
of the court for distribution. None

9.

CRJ:MINAL PINB -

$

10. $5.00 COUlf'l'Y ADMINISTRA~IVB SURCHAR.GB - For deposit in
the county justice fund or current expense fund.
11. $15.00 SURCBARGB--DUI AND DWP ONLY - To fund interlock
ignition and electronic monitoring devices, which shall be
paid to the clerk of the court.
12. DRUG

Ellli'ORCEMBN~ R2STXTU~%Cll1

- The sum 1isted be1ow shall

be paid to the agency or agencies listed below as restitution
for the costs of investigation and/or prosecution of the
violations hereinabove found to have been committed, to-wit:
$765.00 to the State of Idaho.
All of the previous stated amounts of money are.due and payable to
the District Court Clerk at a rate set by the defendant's probation
officer commencing on a date set by defendant's probation officer,
and a like monthly payment on the same day of each and every month
thereafter until completely paid.
I~ IS PORTKBR OlU>BRED-the defendant is to serve 36~ days in the
Payette County Jail, the court suspended 180 days, which it granted
as discretionary jail time, to be imposed upon written request of
this court. The remaining 180 days shall be served with credit for
97 days already served. The defendant shall report to the Payette
County Sheriff on July 8, 1997, at 8:00 p.m. and will be allowed

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION ON SUSPENDED EXECUTION
OF JUDGMENT

.

3
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work release.
OTIJBR SPECIAL CONDXTXONS:
l. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete any and
all programs of rehabilitation as required by his probation
officer.
2..

The defendant shall not consume any alcohol while on probation.

The terms of defendants probation may be revoked, modified or
extended at any time by the Court and, in the event of· any
violation of the conditions hereof, during the period of probation,
the Court may revoke this Order and cause the sentence to be
imposed.
Defendant is s ject to arrest without warrant for
violation of~y conditio
reby imposed.

DATED this µ a y of

, 1997

.Stephen

I understand, accept and will abide by the terms and conditions of
the above Order.

Dated this

07

day of ....:r:....._~_.__'t.,,.._______ , 1997.

Defendant

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION ON SUSPENDED EX~CUTION
OF JUDGMENT
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TERMINATED

U.S. District Court
District of Oregon (Portland)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 3:10-cr.. 00389-MA All Defendants
Date Filed: 09/30/2010
Date Terminated: 12/08/2010

Case title: USA v. Medina-Gutierrez

Assigned to: Judge Malcolm F. Marsh

Defendant (1)
Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez
TERMINATED: 1210812010

represented by Gerald M. Needham
Office of the Federal Public Defender
101 S.W. Main Street
Suite 1700
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 326-2123
Pax: (503) 326-5524
Email: jerry_needham@fd.org
AJTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender or
Community Defender Appointment

Pending Counts

Disposition

ILLEGAL ENTRY BY ELUDING
EXAMINATION AND INSPECTION
BY IMMIGRATION OFFICERS - 8
USC 1325(a) (misdemeanor)

IMPRISONMENT= 167 DAYS; FEE
ASSESSMENT= $10

(2)

Highest Offense Level (Opening)

Petty Offense

Terminated Counts

Disposition

REENTRY OF DEPORTED ALIEN =
8 USC 1326(a)
(1)

DISMISSED ON MOTION OF
GOVERNMENT

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
Felony

Complaints

Disposition

5°}
https://ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl ?583700927244419-L_452_0-1

EXHIB1Tl2_
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None

Plaintiff
represented by Fredric N. Weinhouse
United States Attorney's Office
1000 S. W. Third A venue
Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204

USA

(503) 727-1014
Fax: (503) 727-1117
Email: fred. weinhouse@usdoj.gov
AITORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan W. Bounds
U.S. Attorney's Office
1000 SW 3rd Ave
Rm600
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 727-1141
Fax: (503) 727-1117
Email: ryan.bounds@usdoj.gov
TERMINATED: 1011812010
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

09/30/2010

l

Indictment as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (l); Count 1: 8 USC
1326(a) - Illegal Reentry by Deported Alien; Count 2: 8 USC 1325(a) Illegal
Entry by Eluding Examination and Inspection by Immigration Officers
(misdemeanor). (kw) (Entered: 09/30/2010)

09/30/2010

2

10/0112010

3

Notice of Case Assignment to Judge Anna J. Brown. (kw) (Entered:
0913012010)

Minutes of Proceedings: First Appearance/Arraignment/Detention hearing
before Magistrate Judge Paul Papak as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez
held on 10/1/2010. Arraignment held for Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez {l) Count
1,2. Defendant(s) waived reading of the Indictment. Defendant(s) advised of
rights; waives reading of charges~ proceeds as named. Not guilty plea(s)
entered. Order that Discovery is due in 14 days. Order appointing counsel.
Detention Hearing held Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (1) Defendants LocationCustody status is: Detained as flight risk. Jury Trial is set for 1217/2010 at
09:00AM in Portland Courtroom before Judge Anna J. Brown. Counsel Present
for Plaintiff: Ryan Bounds. Counsel Present for Defendant: Gerald Needham.
(Tape #FTR (gm)) (Interpreter for Defendant Present: Tina Machuca) (gm)
(Entered: 10/01/2010)

10/01/2010

4

Amended Minutes ol Proceedings: First Appearance/Arraignment/Detention
hearing before Magistrate Judge Paul Papak as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-

too
https://ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pJ ?583700927244419-L_452_0-1
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Gutierrez held on 10/1/2010. Arraignment held for Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez
(1) Count 1,2. Defendant(s) waived reading of the Indictment. Defendant(s)

advised of rights; waives reading of charges; proceeds as named. Not guilty
plea(s) entered. Order that Discovery is due in 14 days. Order appointing
counsel. Detention Hearing held Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez ( 1) Defendants
Location-Custody status is: Detained as flight risk. 1-Day Jury Trial is set for
1217/2010 at 9:00AM in Portland Courtroom before Judge Anna J. Brown.
Counsel Present for Plaintiff: Ryan Bounds. Counsel Present for Defendant:
Gerald Needham. (Tape #FfR (gm)) (Interpreter for Defendant Present: Tina
Machuca) (gm) (Entered: 10/04/2010)
Order of Detention as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez by US
Magistrate Judge Paul Papak; signed on 10/1/10. (kw) (Entered: 10/04/2010)

10/01/2010

~

10/06/2010

Q Request for Discovery by Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (Needham, Gerald)
(Entered: 10/06/2010)

10/0612010

~

Arrest Warrant Returned Executed on 10/1/l 0 as to Defendant Ernesto
Medina-Gutierrez. (kw) (Entered: 10/13/2010)

10/07/2010

1

Trial Management Order by Judge Anna J. Brown as to Ernesto MedinaGutierrez. (bb) (Entered: 10/07/2010)

10/18/2010

.2

Notice of Attorney Substitution: Attorney Fredric N. Weinhouse added for
Plaintiff USA regarding Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez in place and
stead of Attorney Ryan W. Bounds. (Weinhouse, Fredric) (Entered:
10/18/2010)

1112212010

10

Notice of Case Reassignment: Case reassigned from Judge Anna J. Brown to
Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. (eo) (Entered: 11122/2010)

1112912010

11

Scheduling Order as to Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. A Change of Plea and
Sentencing Hearing is set for 12/8/2010 at 09:30AM in Judge Marsh's
Courtroom before Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. The 2-day jury trial, set for
1217/2010, is stricken. by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh (ca) (Entered: 11129/2010)

12/08/2010

12

Minutes of Proceedings:Bntry of Plea Hearing before Judge Malcolm F.
Marsh for Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. Defendant present; defendant
sworn. Defendant entered a guilty plea to Count 2 of the Indictment. Following
a RuJe 11 col1oquy, the court found the defendant fully competent, accepted his
plea and adjudged him guilty of that offense. Defendant waived preparation of
a presentence report and the court found that one was unnecessary; the court
sentenced defendant to 167 days on Count 2. Defendant shall pay a $10.00 fee
assessment and no fine. The Court GRANTED the government's oraJ motion to
dismiss Count l as to this defendant. Appellate rights waived, and defendant
was remanded to the U.S. Marshal. See Formal Judgment. Counsel Present for
Plaintiff: Fredric N. Weinhouse.Counsel Present for Defendant: Gerald M.
Needham.(Court Reporter Bonita Shumway)(Interpreter for Defendant Present:
Tina Machuca) (ca) (Entered: 12/08/2010)

12/08/2010

1J

Plea Petition as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez and Order Entering
Plea signed by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh in open court on 12/8/l 0. (kw)
(Entered: 12/08/2010)

https://ecf.ord. uscouns.gov/cgi-bin/DktRptpJ ?583700927244419-L_452_0- I
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12/08/2010

li

Plea Agreement as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. (kw) (Entered:
12108/2010)

12/0812010

ll

Judgment & Commitment as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez (1),
Count 1 of the Indictment = DISMISSED ON MOTION OF GOVERNMENT;
Count 2, (8 USC 1325(a) =Illegal Entry by Eluding Examination and
Inspection by Immigration Officers - misdemeanor): IMPRISONMENT= 167
DAYS; FEE ASSESSMENT= $10; Defendant remanded to custody of US
Marshal; by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh; signed on 12/8/10. (kw) (Entered:
12/08/2010}

12/08/2010

16

Judgment in a Criminal Case Personal Identification Attachment (AO 245H) as
to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez. This document is filed UNDER
SEAL. (kw) (Entered: 12/08/2010)

02/02/2011

17

Judgment & Commitment 15 as to Defendant Ernesto Medina-Gutierrez
returned executed on 115/11; Defendant received at FDC - Sheridan, Sheridan,
Oregon. (kw) (Entered: 02/03/2011)

I

PACER Service Center

I

Transaction Receipt

I

02/25/201114:11:27

IPACER

1Lomn:

llnh0091

f(g:;::

llmedina

IDocket

ll~earcb

113: 10-cr-00389-MA Start date:

I
iLJ!cost:

!Description: IReport
Billable
Pages:

Criteria:

l/1/1970 End date: 2/25/2011
110.24

https://ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRptpl ?583700927244419-L_452_0-l

I
I

l

I
I
1

I

2/2512011

Nov 10 2011

Document 15

Case 3:10-cr-00389A0245B

1

page

3:05PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mrl.-::iy, B 2083458274

Filed 12/08/ 10

·7

Page 1 of 4

Page iD#: 54

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case - DISTRlCT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 711/08
Sheet 1
UNITED STATES DISTlUCT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

v.

Case Number: CR

10~389-MA

USM Number: 74001065

ERNESTO MEDINA-GUTIERREZ

ELLEN C. PITCHER
Defendant's Attorney
FREPRJC N. WEINHOUSE
AssiBtant U.S. Attorney
THE DEFENDANT:

[ J

pleaded guilty to count 2 of the Indiclment.
pleaded nolo contendere to cOWll:(s) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _which was accepted by tile court

[ ]

was found guilty on count(s) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,after a plea ofnot guilty.

[X}

The defendant is adjudicated guilty ofthe following offense(s):

Date Olfease
Title & Seqlog

Nature ofOff'ense

Coneluded

8 USC §132S(a}

E1uding Examination and Inspection by Immigration Officers

September 13, 2010

Count Npmber{s)
2

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through i ofthis judgm.c:nt. The sentence is imposed plll'Suantto the Sentencing Reform
Act ofl984.
( ]
[X]
[XJ

The defendant has been fuundnot guilty on count(s)
and is discharged as to such coWlt(s).
Count t of the Indictment is dismi$$Erl on the motion of the United States.
The de:Rm.dant shall pay a $pecial assessment in the amount of$.lll.JH! for Count i payabre immediately to the Clerk of the U.S.
District Court. (See also the Criminal Monetary Penalties sheet.)

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attomey for this district within 30 days of any change of name,
residence. or mailing address until all fines, restitution. costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered
to pay restitution, the defendant shall notify the oowt and the United States Attorney ofany material change in the defendant's ec<momic

circwnstances.
Decembers, 2010
Date of Imposition ofSetitence

M~~

Signature of Judicial Officer

MALCOLM F. MARSH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Name and Title of Judicial Officer

Date

/.zy/;o
• •

EXHIBIT E
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(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case - DISTRICT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 7/1/08
Sheet 2 - Imprisonment

DEFENDANT:

MEDINA-GUTIERREZ, ERNBSTO

Judgment-Page 2 of 4

CASE NUMBER: CR 10·389-MA

IMPRISONMENT
As to count Two (.2), the defendant is hereby committed to the cust-Ody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be
imprisoned fur a tenn of one hundred sixty-seven (J 67) days. No fine is being imposed as defendant has no flnancial
resources or appreciable ellllling capacity.
(X ) The court makes the following re<:om:mendations to the Blll'eall of Prisons: FCl, Sheridan. Oregon, to facilitate visiting
opportul'lities with tamily who reside in the area.

[X] The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

[ ] The defendant shal~ surrender to the United Sm.res Marshal for this district:
[ ]
at
Jam. [ I p.m. on._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[ ]

as notified by the United States Marsha.I.

[ J The defendant shall SUtrendm- for service of sentence at tile institution designated by the Bureau <>f Prisons:
[ ]
[ )

before 2:00 p.m. on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
~s

notified by the United States Marshal and/or Pretrial Services.

The Bmeau of Prisons will determine the amount of prior custody that may be credited towards the service of sentence as authoriud by
Title 18 USC §358.5{b) and the Policies oflhe Bureau of Pmons.

RETURN
l havo ex:ei:uted 1bis judgmc;nt as :follows:

Defendant delivered on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

to.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

BY~--~-----~--------~~
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Nov 10 2011
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(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case~ DISTRICT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 7/1108
Sb.eet 5 - Criminal Monetary Penalties
·

Judgment-Page 3 of 4

DEFENDANT:
MEDINA-GUTIERREZ, ERNESTO
CASE NUMBER; CR I 0-389-MA

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
The defendant shall pay the following total criminal monetary penalties in accordance wilh the Schedule of Payments set forth
in this Judgment:

Assessment
(as noted on Sheet ll
TOTALS

$10.00

TOTAL

Restitution
$0.00

$10.00

] The determination of:restitvtion is deferred until - - - - - - - · · An Amended Ju<lgment in a Criminal Case will be
entered after such determination.

( ] The defend.ant shall make restitution (including oommunity restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.
Ifthe defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shaH receive an approximately proportioned pa)llllent, unless specified
otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(1), all non·
federal victims must be paid in full prior to the United States receiving payment

Name of P@yee

Amount of Restitution

Priority Order

Qrdmd

or Percenta1e ol PaYf!IPt

TQtal Amount gf Los§•

$

TOTALS

( ] If applicable, restitution ammmt ordered pursuant to pka agreement

$·-~-----

[ ] The defendant shall pay interest on any fine or restitlltion of more tban $2,500, unless the fine or restitution is paid in fWl
befo:re the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to l 8 U.S.C. § 3612(1). All of the payment options on the
Schedule of Paymcm1s may be subject to penalti~ for delinquency and default, purswmt to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g}.

J The court detennined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and :it is ordered that
[ ]

the interest requirement is waived for the [ ) fine and/or ( ] restitution.

[ ]

tbe interest requirement for the [ ) fine and/or [ ] restitution is modified as foJJows:

Any payment shall be divided proportkmatdy lllllOrti the payees named unless otherwise specified.

*Fin clings for lhc total amwnt oflO§es are required under Chapten l09A, 110, llOA., snd l l.3A ofTitle JS, United Stall!S Code, for offenses c:ommiUed on
or after Sepmnber 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.
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Case 3: 10-cr-0038
A 0 24.5B

Document 15

Filed 12108/10

Page 4 of 4

Page ID#: 57

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case - DISTRICT OF OREGON CUSTOMIZED 11110'8
Sheet 6 - Schedule of Payments

D:£FENDANT;
MBDINA-OUTIERREZ. ERNESTO
CASE NUMBER: CR l0-.389·MA

Judgment-Page 4 of 4

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS
Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, pa)'lllent of the tQtal aimlnal monetary penalties shall be due as follows:
A.

ex l

Lu.mp sum payment of$ 10.00
[. )

not later than

[ ]

in accordance with [

due immediately, balance due
or

JC or { ] D below; or

B. [X}

Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C below), or

c.

If there is any unpaid halaru:e at the time of defendant's release from custody, it shall be paid in monthly installments of
not Jess than $10.00 until paid in full, to.commence immediately upon reieme from imprisOJllllent.

[X]

D. [ ]

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetaty penalties:

Unless the court llas expressly ordered otherwise in the special instructions above, it this judgment imposes a period of
imprisonment,paymentofcriminalmonetarypenalties,inc1udingrestittttion,sbal1beduoduringtheperiodofimprisomnentasfollows:
(1) SO% of wages earned if the defendant is participating in a prison industries program; (2) $10 per quarter if the defendant is not
working in a prison industries program.

It is ordered that resources received li'om any source, including inheritaru.1e, settlement. or any other judgment. shall be applied to any
restitution or fine still owed, pursuant to IS USC § 3664(n).
All criminal monetary penalties, including restitution, except those payments ma.do through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate
Financial Respoosibility Program. are ma.de to the Clerk of Court at the address below, unless otherwise directed by the Court, the
Probation Officer, or the United States Attorney.
(X) Clerk of Court

US DistTkt Court - Oregon
1000SW Third Avenue
Su.lie 740

Portbnd, OR 97204

J Clerk of Court

l

Clerk of Court

US District Court - Oregoa

US District Court- Oregt>n

405 J'.ssj 8111 Avenue

310 We»t Bhtla Street

Suite 2100
Eqgeae., OR 97401

RoomlOI
Medford, OR 97501

The defendant shall receive credit fur all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

I ) Joint and Several
Case Number
Defendant and Co~Defendant Names
(including defendant nypibe.r)

(. J
( ]

[ 1

Joint and Several
Total Amount

Amount

Corresponding Payee,
if@.PPTOpriate

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
The .defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the fo1lowing property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the foUowing order: ( l) assessment. (2) restitution principal, {3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine
interest,, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost ofpro!le(:ution and court costs.

Nov 10 2011

page ?1

3:07PM Nevin, Benjamin, Mrkay, 8 2083458274

U.S. Department i, . ·;.. ·rmelau() Scc111·i11·
Dct::ntil>n and Removal Optrations
51 l N\V Hroadwar

Porlland. OR 97209

U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement
PROSECUTION REPORT
DATE: September 28, 2010

DEFENDANT:

MEDl~A-Gutierrez,

Ernesto (A 90 623 722)

AKA(s): MEDINA, Ernesto GI MARTINEZ-Gomez, Miguel

CITIZENSHIP: Mexico
DATE OF BIRTH: December 21, 1957
PLACE OF BIRTH: Mexico
STATUTES VIOLATED: 8 USC 1326
MANNER OF ENTRY: Unlawful (Without Inspection)

PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown
DATE OF ENTRY: On or after November 19, 1997

NUMBER OF TIMES DEPORTED: l
PLACE OF LAST DEPORT: Nogales, Arizona
DATE OF LAST DEPORT: November 19, 1997
TYPE OF DEPORT: NT A/IJ (subject was a priot LPR)

FOUND OR LOCATED BY: Carol Schindele, Immigration Enforcement Agent, ICE
DATE FOUND: September 13, 2010
PLACE FOUND: Malheur County, Oregon

DATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST: September 13, 2010
DATE REVIEWED/ACCEPTED FOR PROSECUTION: September 17, 201 O

EXHiBITL
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(PROSEClJTION REPORT CON.TINUED)

FBI# 517835AB4 SID# ORl 1579574
DISTRIBUTION: Original to AUSA/Copy to A File
CASE Officer(s}: Jacob James
AUSA: Ryan W. Bounds

SYNOPSIS

MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto is a citizen and native of Mexico who claims birth in Mexico. ICE
records show that the defendant entered the United States without inspection on or after November 19,
1997, after being deported to Mexico from the United States. ICE records indicate that the defendant was
deported :from the United States to Mexico through Nogales, Arizona, on November 19, 1997. An
executed Warrant of Deportation (ICE Form I-205) contained in the ICE file bearing the subject's right
index fingerprint, records his removal to Mexico under a lawful order of deportation.
On September 13, 2010; ICE Deportation Officer Carol Schindele located MEDINA-Gutierrez,
Ernesto near his residence, in Malheur Counfy, Oregon.

MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto has a criminal record in the State ofidaho, consisting of the following
conviction(s):
I. Convicted in the District Court of the Third Judicial District for .the State of Idaho, County of
Payette, on or about May 04, 1995, case CR FE 9600555D.
Count 1: Delivery of a Controlled Substance - Cocaine, in violation ofidaho Code, Section
37-2732, which resulted in a sentence of2 years and 6 months minimum confinement and a
subsequent indeterminate term of confinement not to exceed 2 years and 6 months, for an
aggregate teJnl of 5 years, suspended - 5 years probation. Further ordered that defendant is to
serve 360 days in jail with 18-0 days suspended and credit for 97 days time served.
The Innnigration File for MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto contains a record of the following
removals/deportations from the United States to Mexico:

l. November 19, 1997, through Nogales, Arizona.
On September 23, 2010, the fingerprints of MEDINA~Gutierrez, Ernesto were compared with the right
index fingerprint memorialized on the executed Warrant of Deportation (ICE Fmm I-205), dated
November 19, 1997, by William Jugle, a qualified fingerprint examiner, employed as a contract
2
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(PROSECUTION REPORT CONTINUED)
employee with the Department of Homeland Security, Biometrics Support Center West, who detennined
that all of the fingerprints submitted were made by the same person.
A review of his immigration file indicated that MEDINA-Gutierrez, Ernesto, an alien, never applied for
or received the required consent of the Attorney General of the United States or the Secretary for the
Department ofHomeJand Security to apply for admission into the United States after having been
deported, in violation of Title 8 United States Code, Section 1326 (a), (b)(l), & (b)(2).

REPORT BY: Jacob James, Deportation Officer
REPORT DATE: September 28, 2010

3
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THI.RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Payette Gixunty, Idaho
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Jdaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

__.:_----A.M.-.. -~---P.M.
BElTY J. DRES.SEN
B

,Dept

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
)

ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,

)
)

Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-2011-319

OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

I. INTRODUCTION:

Mr. Medina - a citizen of Mexico lawfully entered the United States as a worker in
1986. Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Petition") if 9, Exh. A & C. In December
1990, Mr. Medina became a legal permanent resident and was given a green card that expired in
2001. Id. Mr. Medina and his wife, Luz, have four children ranging in ages from eleven to
twenty-four years of age, all of whom are legal pennanent residents or United States citizens.

Petition if 8, 10.
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In 1996, Mr. Medina was accused of delivery of a controlled substance fo the criminal
case underlying the instant post-conviction petition. Payette County Case No. CR-FE-1996-555. 1
With respect to the criminal charges, Mr. Medina's highest priority was to keep ms green card so
he could continue living in the area and caring for his family. Petition~ 18. 20. Mr. Medina was
very proud of the fact that he had no criminal history and he believed maintaining a clean record
was important to his immigration status. Petition 1f 18. Therefore, on three occasions, Mr.
Medina asked defense counsel if accepting a plea agreement would effect his immigration status.

Id. On each occasion, counsel assured Mr. Medina that the plea agreement and sentence would
not effect his green card and that he could remove the conviction from his record after 3 months.

Id.
Based on his attorney's assurances, Mr. Medina entered a written plea agreement with the
state whereby he would enter an Alford plea to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance.
Petition if 18-19. The agreement indicated that Mr. Medina would be placed on probation for a
period of five years and that as a condition of probation, he serve 360 days ofjail. Affidavit of
Counsel, Exh. A. The agreement indicated that 180 of those days would be suspended and
served at the discretion of the probation officer. Id. The agreement further provided that Mr.
Medina would receive credit for 97 days already served and that the remaining 83 days would be
served with work privileges. Id.
On June 6, 1997, the district court sentenced Mr. Medina in accordance with the plea
agreement. Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. B~ C. The district court ordered Mr. Medina to report for

1

The Register of Actions for the delivery case was attached to an affidavit submitted with
the state's motion for summary dismissal.

2
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his jail time on July 8, 1997 and to complete all rehabilitative programs required by his probation
officer. Id. On November 19, 1997, Mr. Medina was deported to Mexico via Nogales on foot.
Petition, Exh. D; Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. F. Mr. Medina was very confused by the
immigration proceedings and did not have a clear understanding of their outcome. Petition if 25.
Immigration left Mr. Medina's green card in his possession, which indicated it expired in
200 I . Petition ~ 26, Exh. A. Because Immigration did not take the green card from Mr. Medina
and his attorney had advised him that his conviction would not effect his i.mmjgration status, he
believed it must still be effective. Petition ~ 26. Mr. Medina presented the green card at the
border when he returned to the United States and was allowed to enter. Id.
In September 2010, Immigration arrested Mr. Medina for being in the United States
unlawfully. Petition 130; Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. F. Thereafter, the United States charged
Mr. Medina in the District of Oregon with Reentry of Deported Alien in violation of8 U.S.C.
§ l 326(a),. a felony. Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. D. Mr. Medina pied guilty to misdemeanor

Illegal Entry by Eluding Examination and Inspection by Immigration Officers and was sentenced
to 167 days of incarceration, which he served in the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in
Sheridan. Oregon. Petition 129; Affidavit of Counsel, Exh. D. Mr. Medina is presently in
[mmigration's custody in Tacoma, Washington pending removal from the United States. Petition
~

l, 29.
During consultation with attorneys fo11owing the re-entry case, Mr. Medina discovered

that the conviction in the delivery case is considered an aggravated felony that renders him
ineligible for any type of relief from deportation under current immigration laws. Petition if 30.
In March 2011, Mr. Medina discovered that if he had entered a guilty pJea before April l, 1997,
3
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he could have been eligible for relief from deportation under the prior version of the law.
Petition if 30; see INS. v. Sr. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that discretionary relief
from deportation available before amendments to immigration laws that became effective in
April 1997 remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea
agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for that relief
at the time of their plea under the law then in effect).
On March 23, 2011, Mr. Medina filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his attorney's incorrect
advice concerning the effect that his plea in the delivery case would have on his status as a legal
permanent resident. On September 22, 2011, the state filed a motion for summary disposition
arguing that Mr. Medina's petition should be dismissed as untimely. 2 As explained below. the
state's motion should be denied.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

Pertinent Legal Standard
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature.

Schultz v. State, 151Idaho383, 385, 256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 2011); Sparks v. State, 140
Idaho 292, 295, 92 P .3d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a post-conviction
action is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material
fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief Amboh v.
State, 149 Idaho 650, 651, 239 P.3d 448, 449 (Ct. App. 2010); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,

2

The petition's alleged untimeliness is the only basis on which the state seeks summary
disposition and, thus, is the only issue addressed in this opposition.
4
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272, 61 P. 3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 651, 239 P.3d at 449; Sparks, I 40 Idaho at

295, 92 P.3d at 545.
A petition for post-conviction re1ief may be filed at any time within one year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the detennination of appeal or from the determination of
a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. LC. § 19-4902(a). The statute of limitation
may be equitably tolled to protect a petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful
opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 P.3d at 793-94; Leer

v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115, 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009).

2.

The State's Motion Should Be Denied Because Mr. Medina Has Presented an Issue
of Fact as to Whether the Time to File His Post-Conviction Relief Petition Should Be
Equitably Tolled
On March 31, 20 l 0, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v.

Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) and held that counsel must advise non citizen clients regarding
the risks of deportation in criminal cases. Padilla rejected the distinction between counsel's duty
to advise regarding the collateral versus direct consequences of a guilty p1ea, a distinction which

had been adhered to by Idaho courts. Because Padilla announced a new rule in Idaho and Mr.
Medina's post-conviction petition would have been denied if he had filed it before the Padilla
decision was announced, due process requires that the post-conviction statute of limitation be
equitably tolled to give Mr. Medina a reasonable opportunity to present ills claim. Further, Mr.
Medina's petition raises an issue of fact as to whether he brought his post-conviction claim
within a reasonable amount of time after discovering that his attorney's advice had been
affirmatively incorrect regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Accordingly,
5
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the Court should deny the state's motion for summary disposition and set this matter for an
evidentiary hearing.

1.

Mr. Medina is entitled to equitable tolling because Padilla announced a new
rule

In Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 219 P.3d 1204 (Ct App. 2009), the Court of Appeals
recognized that the announcement of a new rule could give rise to a basis to equitably toll the
statute of limitations. 3 EquitabJe tolling in post-conviction actions is borne of the petitioner's due
process right to have a meaningfu] oppornmity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at
385-86, 256 P.3d at 793-94; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d at 1176. Where the United States
Supreme Court announces a decision that establishes that Idaho courts had previously
misinterpreted the law, the statute of limitations must be tolled in order to provide postconviction relief petitioners with a meaningful opportunity to present their claims.
The Supreme Court's decision in Padilla established that Idaho had incorrectly
interpreted the Sixth Amendment for more than twenty years. Had Mr. Medina timely brought
his post-conviction claim, it would have been erroneous1y denied based on Idaho's
misinterpretation of counsel's duties under the Sixth Amendment. Now that Padilla has
established that Mr. Medina is entitled to relief, he must have a meaningful opportunity to
present his post-conviction claims.
A new rule is one not dictated by precedent existing at the time a judgment became final.

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 ( 1989);

3

Ultimately, the Court did not apply equitable tolling based on its conclusion that the
case at issue -Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)- did not announce a new
ruJeoflaw. Kriebel, 148Idahoat 191,219P.3dat 1207.
6
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Kriebel ' 148 Idaho at 191.. 219 P.Jd at 1207. A case will be deemed to have announced a new
rule ifits outcome was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds. Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407, 415 (1990); Kriebel, 148 Idaho at 191, 219 P.3d at 1207. The explicit overruling of an
ear]ier holding no doubt creates a new rule. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416; Kriebel~ 148 Idaho at
191, 219 P.3d at 1207.
Immigration consequences have been considered collateral, rather than direct, to a guilty
plea. For over twenty years the Idaho courts indicated that the Sixth Amendment contains no
duty for a criminal attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences. See Ray v. State, 133
Idaho 96, 102 982 P.2d 931, 937 (1999) (holding that the Sixth Amendment contains no implied
duty for an attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Retamoza v.

State, 125 Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 P.2d 603, 607-08 {Ct. App. 1994) (stating it had previously
adopted "'the rule recognized by many other jurisdictions that the Sixth Amendment implies no
duty for an attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Jones v.

State, 118 Idaho 842. 844, 801 P .2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that failure to inform of
collateral consequences does not rise to the constitutional threshold of ineffective assistance of
counsel); LaBarge v.State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59~ 62 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating the
Sixth Amendment imposes no duty on counsel to inform his client of such collateral
consequences of the guilty plea); Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 468, 469, 776 P.2d 830, 831 (Ct.
App. 1989) (noting that numerous jurisdictions have held that the Sixth Amendment contain no
implied duty for an attorney to inform cJient of collateral consequences of a guilty plea).
The Padilla Court expressly rejected the collateral/direct consequences distinction as it
relates to the advice concerning immigration consequences that attorneys must provide, holding:
7
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Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct
or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus
ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of
deportation. We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481.
The rule announced in Padilla was not dictated by Idaho precedent existing at the time
Mr. Medina's judgment became final. Indeed, the precedent existing at that time dictated the
opposite result, that his petition be denied because counsel did not have an obligation to infonn
of immigration consequences. See Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 796-97. 874 P .2d at 607-08.
Now that the United States Supreme Court has corrected Idaho's understanding of the
scope of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, Mr. Medina must be given a
meaningful opportunity to present his claim. Accordingly, the time for Mr. Medina to file his
post-conviction relief petition began anew when Padilla was decided. Mr. Medina filed his postconviction relief petition within one year of Padilla and the state's motion to dismiss Mr.
Medina's petition as untimely should be denied.

2.

Mr. Medina is entitled to equitable tolling because be brought the instant
post-conviction relief petition within a reasonable time of discovering the
factual basis for his claim

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would
prec]ude courts from considering claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the
time limit, yet raise important due process issues. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250. 220
P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05, 174 P.3d 870, 874-75
(2007). Unknown claims must be brought within a ":reasonable time" after their discovery and
courts determine what is reasonable on a case by case basis. id. Generally, ineffective assistance

8
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of counsel claims should be known after trial because the facts of the case are particularly within
the knowledge of the defendant. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P .3d at 1072.
Here, counsel repeatedly assured Mr. Medina that his guilty plea would not effect his
immigration status. Further, the plea agreement expressly contemplated that Mr. Medina remain
in the country by providing for work release and that Mr. Medina participate in rehabilitative
programs and complete probation while residing in Oregon. Mr. Medina did not understand the
immigration proceedings concerning his deportation in 1997 and immigration officials left Mr.
Medina's green card in his possession, which indicated that it expired in 200 I. Because
Immigration did not take the green card from Mr. Medina and his attorney had advised him that
his conviction would not effect his immigration status, he believed it must still be effective. Mr.
Medina presented the green card at the border when he returned to the United States and was
allowed to enter.
It was not until September 2010, when Immigration arrested Mr. Medina for being in the
United States unlawfu1ly, that Mr. Medina realized that the advice of his attorney was defective.

Mr. Medina discovered that not only was his attomey•s advice incorrect when he told Mr.
Medina the guilty plea would not effect his green card, Mr. Medina discovered that the type of
crime that he pJed guilty to is considered an aggravated felony that renders him ineligible for any
type of relief from deportation under current immigration laws. Worse yet, had his attorney
researched the applicable law and arranged for Mr. Medina to enter his guilty plea only days
earlier, Mr. Medina could have been eligible for relief from deportation under the prior version of
the law. See !NS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that discretionary relief from
deportation available before amendments to immigration laws that became effective in April

9
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1997 remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and
who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for that relief at the time of
their plea under the law then in effect).
Because Mr. Medina's green card was left in his possession, he was unaware that his
attorney had given him materially incorrect advice regarding the immigration consequences for

many years. He filed the instant petition approximately 6 months after being arrested for illegal
re-entry, during which time he was incarcerated out of state. Mr. Medina has presented an issue
of fact as to whether he brought the instant claim within a reasonable time following its
discovery and the Court should deny the state's motion for summary dismissal.

III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Medina has presented an issue of fact establishing that he is entitled to equitable

tolling. Accordingly, the state's motion for summary disposition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

lcf'> day of November, 2011.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

4.c_BY~~
Rob
e
Attorneys for Petitioner
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Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
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By

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI

, Deputy ,

DISTRICT OF THE~----·~.

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV2011-319

REPLY TO OBJECTION FOR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, Anne-Marie Kelso Prosecuting Attorney, and replies as follows:
Idaho Code Section 19-4902 provides that "[a]n application may be filed at any time within
one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding
following an appeal, whichever is later." Absent a showing by the petitioner that the one-year
limitation should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis
for dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001);

Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct.App.2003). In Idaho, equitable tolling
of the statute oflimitations for filing a post-conviction relief petition has only been recognized:
(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction
without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials; and (2) where mental disease
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from
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earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction. See Leer v. State 148 Idaho 113 (2009); Shultz v.
State 151 Idaho 383 (2011); Amboh v. State 149 Idaho 650 (2010).

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit, in US v. Hong, No. 10-6294 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011)
has decided that the Supreme Court ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky does not apply to the benefit of
defendants whose conviction was final before the decision was handed down. The court held
that "Chang Hong seeks to appeal the district court's denial of his motion for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 as untimely. He asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his
counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea as required by
Padilla . .. We find Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law, but it does not apply retroactively

to cases on collateral review. Therefore, Hong's§ 2255 motion was untimely, and we conclude
Hong has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."
Recently, the Seventh Circuit held that Padilla does not apply retroactively. Chaidez v.
United States (No. 10-3623). The Court concluded that because Padilla announced a new

constitutional rule, that unless there is an exception to retroactively applying the case, Padilla
will not apply to cases already resolved on appeal. In addition, the Third District Court of Appeal
of the State of Florida in Hernandez v. Florida (No. 3D10-2462) (April 2011) has sided with the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits on the issue, leaving it open for the Eleventh Circuit to make a
decision on the case if it goes up on appeal to that court. 1
Furthermore, even if the Court finds that equitable tolling should occur, the Defendant
admits that he suspected his green card was no longer valid in 2000, so he avoided reapplication.
In addition, the Padilla decision was announced in March of 2010, and the Defendant, knowing
his green card was likely invalid, still waited another year before filing the post conviction.

I The Third Circuit ruling in United States v. Orocio, No. I 0-123 I (3d Cir. June 29, 20 I I) is the first U. S. Court of Appeals to
apply Padilla v. Kentucky retroactively.
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DATED this 17th of November, 2011.
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I hereby certify that on this J day of November, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be forward~ith all required charges prepaid, by the method (s)
indicated below, to the person (s) listed below:
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY and BARTLETT
303 West Bannock
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
345-8274
Hand Delivery D
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Payelle County, idaho

DEC 0 9 2011
Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

---AM.
BETTY J. DRESSEN

P.M.

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2011-319
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNESTO
MEDINA JR.

I, Ernesto Medina Jr., being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says:
1. That the Petitioner in this case, Ernesto G. Medina Sr., is my father. I am over the age
of eighteen and make the following statements from personal knowledge.
2. Following my father's arrest by immigration in September, 2010, he was taken to the
Elmore County Jail in Mountain Home. I did not understand why my father had been arrested or
what was required to assist him. Long-time family friend Shelly Roberts and I contacted a
lawyer in Boise, Idaho by the name of Ernest Hoidal to see if he could represent my father. Mr.
Hoidal was provided payment and we understood that he would tell us within four hours whether
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he could assist my father. However, when Mr. Hoidal arrived at the jail to see Mr. Medina, he
was told that he would need to return with paperwork. By the time Mr. Hoidal returned to the
jail with the paperwork the next day, Mr. Medina had already been moved from Elmore County
to Multnomah County in Portland, Oregon.
3. After my father contacted Ms. Roberts to get information regarding his case, we
stopped dealing with Mr. Hoidal and contacted an attorney in Portland, David Shomloo, on Mr.
Hoidal' s recommendation. By the time we contacted Mr. Shomloo, my father had been moved to
Tacoma, Washington. Because the Tacoma facility was an immigration facility, we looked for
an immigration lawyer to see my father in Tacoma. We found a local lawyer that would often
visit the facility to speak with other clients. However, this attorney informed us that my father
needed a criminal lawyer for his case.
4. My father was then moved back to Portland and we again contacted Mr. Shomloo.
We came to understand that my father was charged with illegally re-entering the country because
there was a problem with his immigration status. Mr. Shomloo was hesitant to take my father's
case because it was very complicated. Ultimately, Mr. Shomloo agreed to help. We were then
informed that an attorney from the federal defender's office had been appointed to represent my
father.
5. Mr. Shomloo offered to assist the federal defender however, the federal defender
declined. Mr. Shomloo informed us that we needed to wait until the federal criminal case was
complete in order for him to assist my father with his immigration case.
6. In December, 2010, my father was sent to the federal prison in Sheridan, Oregon to
serve his sentence. In late January 2011, Mr. Shomloo told us that the problem with my father's
2 •
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immigration status was a result of an old conviction in Idaho. Mr. Shomloo instructed us to find
a post-conviction attorney in Idaho in order to help my father.
7. We then searched on the internet for post conviction lawyers in Idaho and after
multiple calls, we were given the number of Nevin, Benjamin, Mckay & Bartlett LLP. In early
February, 2011, we met with Robyn Fyffe and retained her services to represent my father in a
post conviction case. Due to communication difficulties with Mr. Shomloo, we retained Maria
Andrade in Idaho to assist in representing my father in immigration matters. My father has been
incarcerated in Tacoma, Washington as a result of the immigration hold since finishing his
sentence in Sheridan in March of 2011. Although bail was set in July, we have not been able to
afford my father's release.
8. Throughout this ordeal, Ms. Roberts and I have been working together to assist my
father in getting information to and from the lawyers. Communication with the attorneys and my
father has been difficult- a situation aggravated by my father's multiple moves from various
detention facilities. We relied on the advice of attorneys that we needed to wait until the re-entry
case was finished in order to address my father's immigration problem. As soon as we
discovered that the immigration problem was caused by the Idaho conviction, we searched for an
attorney who could file a post-conviction action.
9. Based on multiple conversations with my father concerning his immigration status
over the years before his arrest, I do not believe my father understood that the fact he had been
returned to Mexico by immigration officials was a true "deportation" because his green card and
driver's license were left in his possession. I also do not believe that my father has ever
understood the effect the Idaho conviction had on his immigration papers.
3 •
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This ends my affidavit.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
day of December, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to ~
mailed

---- faxed
hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
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County, Idaho

c 0 9 2011

-----A.M.
BETTY J. DRESSEN

Robyn Fyffe #7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

P.M.

Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-2011-319
AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTIN BROWN

1. I am a legal assistant in the firm of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP.
2. I currently manage attorney Robyn Fyffe's cases and am assigned as her legal
assistant.
3. Beginning on or about February 23, 2011, I attempted to locate Mr. Ernesto Medina's
physical location so that Robyn Fyffe could discuss his case. I was told on numerous occasions
that Mr. Medina was in transport and the Federal Prison Facility in Sheridan, Oregon would not
confirm for me he was being detained there. I placed several phone calls to FCl Sheridan over
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTIN BROWN
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the next two weeks attempting to set up a telephone call with Mr. Medina. It was not until
March 18, 2011, that I was able to arrange for a call with Mr. Medina and Robyn Fyffe. In the
approximately three weeks that I spent corresponding with the Federal Prison in Oregon, I left
multiple voicemails for both staff sergeants and inmate mail personnel in an attempt to contact
Mr. Medina. My calls were almost never returned, and if they were, I was told correspondence
must be in writing to an inmate, that attorney telephone calls must be requested in writing. Ms.
Fyffe sent Mr. Medina a letter on March 3, 2011. However, this letter did not result in Mr.
Medina being able to speak with Ms. Fyffe. After Mr. Medina's telephone call with his attorney,
Robyn Fyffe, letters were sent to him via Fedex on March 23, 2011 and April 1, 2011 in regards
to this case.
This ends my Affidavit
Dated this Cft4day of December, 2011.

-Kr-~.!. is. .:t:_ in-=B: : !. .:ro:_ w_n-=- -+~. . . l. .J~J.A. .A.~c: : : = =- -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
correct copy of the foregoing document to
mailed

~ed

hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
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q day of December 2011, I caused a true and
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BETTY J, DRESSEN

Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2011-319
AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER

Ernesto G. Medina, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says:
1. That I am the Petitioner in the above-titled case.
2. I re-affirm the truth of those statements in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
("Petition"), which are within my personal knowledge. Specifically, I re-affirm Paragraphs 8-31.
3. As described in the Petition, I lawfully emigrated to the United States in 1986 and became a
legal permanent resident in 1990. My wife, Luz, and our growing family lived in the Ontario, Oregon
area since coming to the United States. Keeping my green card and being able to continue caring for my
wife and four children in the Ontario area has been - and is - the most important aspect of my life. I
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knew that having a clean criminal record was an important part of keeping my green card and was very
proud of the fact that in all the years I had been in this country, I had only received a ticket for driving
without a seatbelt in 1990.
4. One day in 1995, I agreed to give a ride to a person I knew named Roberto, who was married
to my niece. We went to a store and I bought a drink. On my way to Ontario, I was stopped and
arrested. I had no idea what was going on and I thought perhaps they thought I had not paid for my
drink. I later found out I was being accused of delivering drugs.
5. I could not afford to bond out and my wife became very mentally ill. She was unable to care
for our children and was taken to the hospital. A friend finally paid for my bond. The people that
worked in the hospital and for Health and Welfare wanted my wife to go to a place for the mentally ill in
Pendleton, Oregon, but I convinced them to put her into my care instead. My wife saw doctors who treat
mental illness and gave her medicine but it did not do her any good.
6. My charges were dismissed. I was told that there had been an error.
7. My wife's condition continued to be very bad and we went to Mexico to see if a doctor there
could help her. We drove from Ontario to Colima, Mexico, where Luz saw a doctor who gave her
medicine. After two months, we returned to Ontario and she continued her treatment with the doctors
there.
8. I obtained work at the Amour meat packing plant in Nampa. One day I was called to the
office and arrested. I had no idea why. My attorney, David Posey, told me that I was being accused of
delivering drugs again and I told him that they were confused and there must be a mistake.
9. I desperately wanted out of jail so that I could help my wife, who continued to be very ill and
had a great deal of difficulty coping with my incarceration. Mr. Posey told me that ifl pled guilty, I
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could get out of jail and I would have to serve an additional 22 days in jail during which I would be
allowed to leave during the day to work. As also described in the Petition, I asked Mr. Posey whether
pleading guilty would effect my immigration papers. As I have said, I had a very clean record and
keeping my papers and green card was the most important thing to me. Mr. Posey told me that he was
sure I would not have problems with my papers ifI pled guilty. Mr. Posey told me that in three months,
he would submit a request to clear my record and that it would then be clean again. Mr. Posey assured
me several times that there would be no problem with my papers if I pled guilty. I relied on this advice
in accepting the plea deal described in the Petition. I was not guilty of delivery of drugs but since Mr.
Posey told me there would be no problem with my papers and my record and my wife was very sick, I
decided the best thing to do was to plead guilty.
10. After reporting to serve my sentence, I spent six days sleeping in the jail and leaving at 5 :00
a.m. and returning at 10 p.m. The next day, I was not allowed to leave because immigration had come
for me. I said there was a mistake because Mr. Posey had said there would be no problem. I was not
allowed to call Mr. Posey before immigration came for me.
11. I spent approximately three months in a detention facility in Arizona, during which time I
went to an immigration court approximately two times. I did not have an attorney, there were a lot of'
people and the officials talked very fact. I did not understand what happened. I was taken to the border
in a vehicle with other people and sent across the border. Immigration had taken the green cards and
licenses of other people who I know who were deported. I thought perhaps there was a mistake after al1
and that my immigration papers were still good. This belief was re-affirmed when I presented the green
card at the border and was permitted to enter the United States.
12. I returned to the Ontario area and continued working and supporting my family. Then one
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day in September, 2010, I was arrested at work. At first I thought perhaps I was arrested because I had
not renewed my green card. I spent four or five days in Mountain Home and was then taken to
Pendeleton, Oregon, where I stayed only about forty minutes. I spent a night in The Dalles, Oregon, and
then a few hours in Portland, Oregon. I was then taken to Tacoma, Washington, where I stayed four
days and then to Sheridan, Oregon, where I remained for 167 days. I came to understand that I had been
charged with illegally re-entering the United States.
13. Finally, in January, 2011, I was told that the problem with my immigration papers was the
conviction from Payette, Idaho, and that I needed to find an attorney to do a post-conviction petition in
Idaho. The Idaho attorneys who were hired to help me, Ms. Fyffe and Maria Andrade, explained to me
that the Idaho conviction is an "aggravated felony" that means my green card can never be renewed.
Although I began to suspect there was a problem with my green card before my arrest, I never
understood that the advice Mr. Posey gave me was completely false.
This ends my affidavit.

Ernesto Gutierrez Medina

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this _ _ day

Notary Public for the State of Washington
Residing a t : - - - - - - - - My commission expires: _ _ _ __
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STATEMENT OF COUNSEL
STA TE OF IDAHO
SS.

COUNTY OF ADA
I, Robyn Fyffe, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say:

1.

That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.

2.

That I am counsel of record for the Petitioner in the above-captioned case.

3.

That I am conversant in the Spanish language.

4.

Mr. Medina is presently being detained in the Northwest Detention Facility in Tacoma,
Washington. It takes several weeks to receive a document that I send to Mr. Medina to be
reviewed and notarized.

5.

I drafted the instant Affidavit based on information that Mr. Medina provided to me in a
letter written in Spanish. I thereafter reviewed the contents of this Affidavit with Mr.
Medina by telephone and he affirmed that the contents therein are true and correct.

6.

I mailed the foregoing Affidavit in order to obtain Mr. Medina's notarized signature.
However, I anticipate it will be several weeks before the signed Affidavit arrives via U.S.
mail.

7.

I will file the notarized Affidavit up~

Robyn Fyffe

........ ~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO

befoi;,e·~\~.;.~.f~~ of December, 2011.
~~ ....
f. ~~,,··
~,.l _,nTA~ ,.· \-t- \:
~-

AAp+w\YV\ Q_A l ;r-t- -·--=--'--'o<-L:l->=~-~-+~-+~--=:-~ 1. \ Pf.J \ c

II ·!::
Notary Public for Idaho ~
\ tP:.
B\.. ••• 0 l
My commission expires: ~
6 '\1/..,'';,••·
..··~·~~. . . :l',,« '11 OF\ ,,....
,...............
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
of the foregoing document to be:
mailed
'X_raxed
hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
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J_ day of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy

Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2011-319

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

I. INTRODUCTION
As described more fully in Mr. Medina's initial opposition to the state's motion for
summary dismissal, Mr. Medina decided to accept a plea offer after his attorney specifically
advised him that the Afford plea to delivery of a controlled substance would not impact his status
as a legal permanent resident. Relying on this advice, Mr. Medina entered an A?ford plea to
delivery of a controlled substance on April 14, 1997.

1
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Thirteen years later, in September, 2010, Mr. Medina was arrested by immigration and
charged with illegal re-entry. He thereafter discovered that his attorney's advice had been grossly
incorrect and rather than having no impact on his immigration status, the delivery charge is
considered an aggravated felony that renders him permanently ineligible for any type of relief
from deportation.

Petition~

30. Mr. Medina also discovered that if he had entered a guilty plea

before April 1, 1997, he could have been eligible for relief from deportation under a prior version
of the law.

Petition~

30.

On March 23, 2011, Mr. Medina filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he relied on his attorney's
incorrect advice concerning the effect that his plea in the delivery case would have on his status
as a legal permanent resident. On September 22, 2011, the state filed a motion for summary
disposition arguing that Mr. Medina's petition should be dismissed as untimely. Mr. Medina
opposed the state's motion and the state submitted a reply. At the hearing on the state's motion,
on November 23, 2011, the district court offered Mr. Medina the opportunity to provide
additional briefing in response to the state's reply. Mr. Medina accepted and offers the following
argument explaining why the state's motion should be denied.

II. ARGUMENT
In opposition to the state's motion to dismiss his petition as untimely, Mr. Medina argued
that in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), the United States Supreme Court conected
Idaho's unreasonable understanding of the scope of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. Thus, the limitation period for Mr. Medina to file his post-conviction relief petition

2
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did not begin to run until Padilla was announced in order to provide Mr. Medina with a
meaningful opportunity to present his claim. Mr. Medina filed his post-conviction relief petition
within one year of Padilla and the state's motion to dismiss Mr. Medina's petition as untimely
should be denied. Additionally, Mr. Medina brought his post-conviction action within a
reasonable time of discovering that his attorney's advice was affirmatively incorrect and
misleading and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The state replied and argued that although Padilla announced a new rule oflaw, it is not
retroactively applicable and thus does not provide a basis to equitably toll the time for Mr.
Medina to file his post-conviction action. The state further argued that Mr. Medina began to
suspect his attorney's advice was incorrect in 2000, when he did not attempt to renew his green
card, and that it was unreasonable to file the petition until nearly a year after Padilla was decided.
Whether Padilla applies retroactively to cases on collateral review - and whether the law
announced in that decision thus applies to Mr. Medina's case - is distinct from whether Mr.
Medina is entitled to equitable tolling. Pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), an "old
rule" applies on both direct and collateral review whereas a "new rule" is retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review if: ( 1) the new rule places certain kinds of criminal conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe; or (2) the new rule is a watershed
rule of criminal procedure that alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction. See also United States v. Orocio,
645 F.3d 630, 637 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Padilla's holding falls strictly within the confines of prior United States Supreme Court
precedent and is therefore a retroactively applicable "old rule" under the Teague doctrine.

Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637. Accordingly, Mr. Ernesto benefits from the law announced in that
opinion although it was announced after his conviction became final.
Distinct from retroactivity is whether the one-year statute of limitation was equitably
tolled. A number of jurisdictions recognize that the announcement of a new rule that meets the

Teague standard for retroactivity provides a basis for equitable tolling. See e.g. 28 U.S.C.A. §
2255(f)(3) (one year period of limitation for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his
conviction and sentence via a habeas application runs from "the date on which the right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); Ga. Code Ann.,

§ 9-14-42(c)(3) (post-conviction statute of limitations begins to run when new retroactively rule
is announced); 15 M.R.S.A. § 2128(5)(B)(same); Neb.Rev.St.§ 29-3001(4)(d) (same); T.C.A. §
40-30-102 (same). Should this Court determine that Padilla announced a new rule for purposes
of Teague, it should also conclude that it is retroactively applicable as a watershed rule of
criminal procedure.
However, Mr. Medina's primary argument concerning equitable tolling is not grounded in

Teague. Rather, despite established Supreme Comi precedent that dictated Padilla's result,
Idaho's prior jurisprudence foreclosed Mr. Medina's claims by holding that counsel's duties did
not extend to the obligation to provide correct advice concerning the immigration consequences
flowing from a conviction because those consequences are "collateral" to the criminal
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proceedings. Now that Idaho's unreasonable interpretation of the Sixth Amendment has been
corrected, due process requires that Mr. Medina be provided with a meaningful opportunity to
present his claim. The considerations restricting retroactive application of new rules are not
applicable in these circumstances and, therefore, Idaho's misapplication of established Supreme
Court precedent entitles Mr. Medina to equitable tolling without demonstrating that Padilla is a
watershed rule of criminal procedure. Moreover, Mr. Medina brought this action within one year
of Padilla, notwithstanding significant barriers to his doing so since September, 2010, and he
therefore initiated this action within a reasonable time after the basis to do so arose.
Finally, Mr. Medina did not discover that his prior conviction resulted in the mandatory
and permanent loss of his immigration status in this country- and thus that his attorney's advice
was affirmatively misleading- until after his arrest in September, 2010. Thereafter, he and his
family and friends diligently sought to discover the best way to address the issue and Mr. Medina
has presented an issue of fact as to whether he brought the instant action within a reasonable
amount of time following the discovery of counsel's ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the
state's motion for summary dismissal should be denied and this matter should be set for an
evidentiary hearing.
A.

Padilla Is Retroactively Applicable

In Teague, the Supreme Court established "two regimes governing the retroactive
application of constitutional principles to criminal cases" by dividing "the world into two
categories, 'old rules' and 'new rules."' Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637. A rule is a "new rule" for

Teague purposes if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
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conviction became final - "new rules" under Teague only apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review if one of two narrow exceptions apply. Id. By contrast, a rule is "old," and thus
retroactively applicable on collateral review, if a court considering the defendant's claim at the
time his conviction became final should have been compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution. United States v. Chang Hong, Dock. No.
10-6294,

1.

F.3d

2011 WL 3805763, 5 (10th Cir. 2011).

Padilla's result was dictated by Supreme Court precedent

Jurisdictions that had rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure
to provide correct advice concerning immigration consequences concluded the Sixth Amendment
did not impose a duty for counsel to advise regarding "collateral" consequences. However,

Padilla made clear that it had never subscribed to a distinction between collateral and direct
consequences. Instead, Padilla straightforwardly applied prior precedent in concluding that
correct information concerning immigration consequences was the kind of important information
necessary for alien defendants to make knowing decisions during the plea process. Because

Padilla flowed directly from prior precedent and established professional norms, it is a
retroactively applicable "old rule."
In Orocio, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "Padilla followed directly
from [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] and long-established professional norms"
and is therefore "an 'old rule' for Teague purposes and is retroactively applicable on collateral
review." Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641. While "the precise question of whether the civil removal
consequences of a plea are within the scope of Strickland had never been addressed by the

6
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Supreme Court before Padilla" the question is "whether counsel has been constitutionally
adequate in advising a criminal defendant whether to accept a plea bargain." Id. at 637-38. The
Orocio Court further noted that in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court held

that the Strickland two-part standard applies to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the
plea process and courts must determine whether counsel's advice to accept a plea was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The Orocio Court explained:
The application of Strickland to the Padilla scenario is not so removed
from the broader outlines of precedent as to constitute a "new rule," for the Court
Juul Jong requiretl effective assistance of counsel on all "important decisions,"
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, in plea bargaining that could "affect[ ] the outcome of
the plea process," Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In that light, Padilla is best read as merely
recognizing that a plea agreement's immigration consequences constitute the
sort of information an alien defendant needs in making "important decisions"
affecting "the outcome of the plea process," and thereby come within the ambit
of the "more particular duties to consult with the defendant" required of effective
counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Far from extending the Strickland rule into
uncharted territory, Padilla reaffirmed defense counsel's obligations to the
criminal defendant during the plea process, a critical stage in the proceedings.
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 638 (emphasis added). This reasoning is illustrated by Mr. Medina's

situation. Notwithstanding its status as a so-called collateral consequence, information regarding
the immigration consequences to Mr. Medina's Alford plea was the single most important aspect
of his decision to plead guilty. His attorney's misleading advice that the plea would not effect his
status most certainly affected the plea process and correct advice regarding the consequences was
"the sort of information" Mr. Medina needed to make an informed decision to plead guilty.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California reasoned:
When the Supreme Court applies a well-established rule oflaw in a new way
based on the specific facts of a pmiicular case, it does not generally establish a
new rule. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1992) (where application
7
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of a prior rule of law did not "break new ground," it was not a new rule); Turner
v. Williams, 3 5 F .3d 872, 885 (4th Cir.1994) ... The issue before the Supreme
Court in Padilla was whether defense counsel's performance met the first prong of
the Strickland test-that is, whether it "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
The Strickland test for what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is an old,
well-established rule oflaw. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)
("It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as 'clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' ").

United States v. Hubenig, Dock. No. 6:03-mj-040 2010 WL 2650625, 5 (E.D.Cal. July 1, 2010);
see also People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. 2011) (Padilla Court simply expanded
Strickland to include counsel's obligation to inform a defendant of possible deportation
consequences. A decision that applies an established general rule (Strickland) to a new set of
facts (deportation) is not a new rule); Denisyuk v. State,_ A.3d_, 2011 WL 5042332 (Md.
2011) (agreeing that Strickland set forth a general standard for application to a specific set of
facts and that Padilla is an application of Strickland to a specific set of facts); Commonwealth v.

Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Mass. 2011) (Padilla retroactive because the two-part Strickland
test provides a general standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, such
claims present the sort of case-by-case application of a general standard that will rarely create a
"new rule"); Ex parte Tanklevskaya, Dock. No. 01-10-00627-CR,

S.W.3d _ , _ , 2011

WL 2132722, at *5-6 (Tex. App. May 26, 2011) (Padilla was reasoned like most Strickland
cases as the Supreme Court merely cited to professional standards and expectations and
identified competent counsel's duty in accordance thereof).
The state relies on Chang Hong and Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.
2011) in support of its contention that Padilla announced a new rule. These courts concluded

8
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that Padilla created a new rule because "a reasonable jurist" would not have considered Supreme
Court precedent as compelling its result and prior cases holding contrary to Padilla were not
unreasonable. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 691-92; Chang Hong, 2011 WL 3805763, at *5-7. These
courts relied on the fact that a number of jurisdictions had applied the collateral versus direct
consequence distinction in concluding that Strickland and Hill did not compel Padilla's result.
However, the fact that Padilla overruled the precedent of lower courts is not dispositive
of whether it established a new rule for Teague purposes. See Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, 5;

Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 2011 WL 2132722, at *5-6; see also Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d
1135, 1143 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007) (although the Court resolved a Circuit split in Roe v.

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), that fact alone does not imply that the Court announced a
new constitutional rule). Rather, the determination of whether a new rule is created is objective
and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new.

Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, 5; Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 2011 WL 2132722, at *5-6.
The Chang Hong Court acknowledged the reasons supporting the conclusion that Padilla
is not a new rule - that it did not overturn any of the Court's prior precedent, that it is grounded in

Strickland and that, even before Padilla was decided, the Court had already recognized the
importance of considering potential immigration consequences when entering into a plea
agreement. It nevertheless noted that many jurisdictions had relied on the collateral versus direct
consequence distinction. Rather than analyze whether such an interpretation is objectively
reasonable, the Court indicated: "All of these courts-including our own-thought the rule in

Padilla was not dictated or compelled by Court precedent. It goes without saying these are some
of the 'reasonable jurists' we must survey to determine if Padilla is a new rule."
9

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

107

Thus, the Chang Hong Court's holding appears to be grounded in the Court's hesitation
to entertain the idea that it had established a rule despite Supreme Court precedent dictating a
contrary result and did not rest on sound, legal analysis. Similarly, the Chaidez Court
acknowledged that the task of determining Padilla's retroactivity was a "difficult" one because
Padilla merely extended the reasoning of prior cases as opposed to explicitly overruling an

earlier holding. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689. The Court relied on the existence of case law
reaching a result contrary to Padilla while acknowledging that "the mere existence of conflicting
authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new." Id. at 691, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 410 (2000). It then held that an objective reading of the relevant cases demonstrates
that Padilla was not dictated by precedent.
Padilla clearly indicated that the Supreme Court had "never applied a distinction between

direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' required under Strickland." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481 (emphasis added). Given that
meaningful advice concerning immigration consequences to a plea is the single most important
aspect of the decision to accept a plea bargain for most non-citizen defendants, the imposition of
such a distinction was an unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill.
Padilla flowed from the clearly established principles of the guarantee of effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland and Hill required counsel to advise criminal defendants at the
plea stage in accordance with precedent and prevailing professional norms to ensure that the
defendant makes an informed, knowing and voluntary decision whether to plead guilty. Padilla
is set within the confines of Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney must give
to a criminal defendant at the plea stage, and did not establish a new rule.
10
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Watershed rule of criminal procedure
Even if this Court concludes that Padilla is a "new rule" for purposes of Teague, it should
nevertheless conclude it is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that alters our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular
conviction. Thus, Padilla is retroactively applicable and provides a basis for equitable tolling.
For lawful immigrants such as Mr. Medina, who are accused of committing crimes,
meaningful advice on the potential effect of their decisions on their immigration status is critical
to entering knowing and intelligent pleas. Although Mr. Medina did not believe that he was
guilty of delivery of controlled substance, he entered the Alford plea believing it was the best way
to maintain his freedom so he could care for his sick wife and their children. Instead, the plea
has effectuated his permanent exile from this country and from his family and friends. Correct
immigration advice implicates the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings and should be
retroactively applied even if a new rule.
B.

Mr. Medina Is Entitled to Equitable Tolling Because Padilla Announced a New Rule
in Idaho
Although Padilla's result was dictated by Strickland and Hill, it was foreclosed by Idaho

jurisprudence. Thus, as argued in Mr. Medina's initial opposition to the state's motion for
summary dismissal, the statute oflimitations must be tolled in order to allow Mr. Medina a
meaningful opportunity to present his claims now that Idaho's unreasonable application of the
Sixth Amendment has been corrected by Padilla. Further, as established above, Padilla is
retroactively applicable for purposes of Teague. In cases such as this one where the state court
unreasonably applied Supreme Court jurisprudence, the reasoning underlying the Teague

11
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doctrine's limitation on retroactive application of new rules does not apply. Accordingly, Mr.
Medina is entitled to equitable tolling without demonstrating that Padilla announced a watershed
rule of criminal procedure.
1.

Padilla is a new rule under Idaho law

The explicit overruling of an earlier holding undoubtedly creates a new rule. Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007); Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. As noted in Mr. Medina's initial

memorandum, Idaho courts held that the Sixth Amendment contains no duty for a criminal
attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences. See Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 102 982
P.2d 931, 937 (1999) (holding that the Sixth Amendment contains no implied duty for an
attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Retamoza v. State, 125
Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 P.2d 603, 607-08 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating it had previously adopted "the
rule recognized by many other jurisdictions that the Sixth Amendment implies no duty for an
attorney to inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea); Jones v. State, 118 Idaho
842, 844, 801 P.2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that failure to inform of collateral
consequences does not rise to the constitutional threshold of ineffective assistance of counsel);
LaBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating the Sixth

Amendment imposes no duty on counsel to inform his client of such collateral consequences of
the guilty plea); Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 468, 469, 776 P.2d 830, 831 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that numerous jurisdictions have held that the Sixth Amendment contain no implied duty for an
attorney to inform client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea).
The Padilla Court expressly rejected the collateral/direct consequences distinction as it
relates to the advice concerning immigration consequences that attorneys must provide and, thus,
12
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expressly overrules Idaho's previous holdings. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. Further, the
Supreme Court clearly indicated that it had never sanctioned some distinction between collateral
and direct consequences. Id. Rather, relying on Strickland and Hill, the Court explained that a
criminal defendant is entitled to a reasonably competent attorney who can provide information
needed to make important decisions affecting the outcome of the plea process. The rule
announced in Padilla was not dictated by Idaho precedent existing at the time Mr. Medina's
judgment became final.
If Mr. Medina had timely brought his post-conviction petition, it would have been
erroneously denied as a result ofldaho's unreasonable limitation on Strickland and Hill. Now
that the United States Supreme Comi has overruled Idaho's jurisprudence concerning the scope
of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, Mr. Medina must be given a
meaningful opportunity to present his claim. Accordingly, the time for Mr. Medina to file his
post-conviction relief petition began anew when Padilla was decided. Mr. Medina filed his postconviction relief petition within one year of Padilla and the state's motion to dismiss Mr.
Medina's petition as untimely should be denied.
2.

Teague doctrine concerns do not apply when a state court misapplies
established Supreme Court precedent and Mr. Medina therefore is not
required to show that Padilla is a watershed rule of criminal procedure

As discussed above, the federal habeas statute and several statutes explicitly provide for
equitable tolling where a new rule meets the Teague criteria for retroactive application. As
argued above, Padilla is retroactively applicable because it was dictated by Strickland and Hill
and is an old rule for purposes of Teague. Thus, the concerns underlying retroactive application

13
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of new rules is inapplicable in this case and Mr. Medina is entitled to equitable tolling without
demonstrating that Padilla is a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
In establishing the narrow exceptions to retroactive application of "new" rules, the
Teague Court reasoned: "application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a

conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the
operation of our criminal justice system." Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10. Retroactive application
of new rules of constitutional law continually forces the states to defend convictions that
conformed to constitutional standards as they existed at the time of the conviction. Id.
States cannot be expected to anticipate new rules that are not dictated by existing
precedent and it is therefore unfair to impose retroactive application of those rules except in
exceptional circumstances. Conversely, states are obligated to follow the dictates of existing
precedent and cannot complain ofretroactive application of a rule they should have been
applying anyway. Idaho unreasonably applied established Supreme Court precedent.
Accordingly, the time for Mr. Medina to file his post conviction petition began to run when the
Supreme Court announced Padilla, so that Mr. Medina is afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present his claims.
C.

Mr. Medina Brought His Post-Conviction Action Within a Reasonable Time
Following Padilla
Even though Mr. Medina filed his post-conviction petition within one year of Padilla, the

state implies that he delayed an unreasonably long-time in filing his petition and that it should be
time-barred even if Padilla would otherwise entitle him to equitable tolling. However, in
providing criminal defendants with one-year following the finality of their convictions to initiate

14
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a post-conviction action, the legislature recognized one year as a reasonable amount of time to
prepare and file a post-conviction action based on claims that existed at that time. See LC. §
19-4902. Those statutes addressing collateral relief from criminal convictions that explicitly
provide those circumstances in which the statute can be equitably tolled based on a retroactively
applicable new rule recognize that the limitations period begins to run when the new rule is
announced. See e.g. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255(£)(3) (one year period of limitation for a federal
prisoner to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence via a habeas application runs from "the
date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court"); Ga. Code Ann.,
§ 9-14-42(c)(3) (petition for relief from conviction must be filed within four years from the date
"on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
or the Supreme Court of Georgia"); 15 M.R.S.A. § 2128( 5)(B)( one year limitation period runs
from the latest of the following: "the date on which the constitutional right, state or federal,
asserted was initially recognized"); Neb.Rev.St.§ 29-3001(4)(d) (one-year limitation period runs
from the later of: "The date on which a constitutional claim asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court of the United States or the Nebraska Supreme Court"); T.C.A. § 40-30-102
(providing court jurisdiction to consider post-conviction claims after the expiration of the
limitations period when "the claim in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate
court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial, if
retrospective application of that right is required" in which case the petition must be filed within
one year of the ruling of the highest court establishing the right).
The one-year statute of limitations set forth in I.C. § 19-4902 was tolled until the United
States Supreme Court announced it's decision in Padilla. Mr. Medina's petition was therefore
15
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timely because it was brought within the one-year time period. Further, as described more fully
below, Mr. Medina and his family and friends struggled diligently to pursue his rights in the
months before his petition was filed despite being confronted by difficulties associated with Mr.
Medina's federal incarceration and a confusing maze of information from multiple sources.
Thus, even if this Court determines that the limitation period did not begin anew when Padilla
was announced, Mr. Medina brought the petition within a reasonable time period given his
particular circumstances.

D.

Mr. Medina Is Entitled to Equitable Tolling Because He Brought the Instant PostConviction Relief Petition Within a Reasonable Time of Discovering the Factual
Basis for His Claim
As set forth in Mr. Medina's initial opposition, Mr. Medina did not discover that his

attorney had provided materially misleading and incorrect advice until following his arrest by
immigration officials in September, 2010. Following Mr. Medina's arrest, he and his family and
friends diligently worked to discover the basis of the immigration problem and to address that
problem. He filed the instant petition approximately six months after being arrested for illegal
re-entry, during which time he was incarcerated out of state. Mr. Medina has presented an issue
of fact as to whether he brought the instant claim within a reasonable time following its
discovery and the Court should deny the state's motion for summary dismissal.
In reply, the state noted that Mr. Medina began to suspect the green card was no longer
good and he was afraid to apply to renew it. However, this suspicion did not lead Mr. Medina to
believe that his attorney had provided him with affirmatively incorrect advice. Rather, he
believed there was perhaps some confusion that would need to be resolved. Affidavit of
Petitioner,~
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Medina did not understand that his attorney's advice had been entirely false and that his A{ford
plea resulted in his permanent exclusion until well after his arrest in September, 2010.
Further, upon learning that the Payette conviction had caused an immigration problem,
Mr. Medina and his family and friends diligently sought to remedy the situation. Affidavit of
Petitioner,~[

13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. ii 2-4; and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts ii 2-4.

The intersection of federal criminal law, immigration law and state and federal post-conviction
jurisprudence is confusing for most attorneys let alone lay people. Mr. Medina, his son and longtime family friend diligently struggled to find a way to remedy Mr. Medina's situation as he was
moved throughout the Northwest. Affidavit of Petitioner, ii 12-13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina,
Jr. if 4-8; and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts ii 4-8. Mr. Medina's incarceration made
communication with attorneys and families extremely difficult and hampered efforts to find the
correct remedy. Affidavit of Petitioner,

ii 12; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. if 2-8; Affidavit of

Shelly Roberts if 2-8; and Affidavit of Kristin Brown if 3. Mr. Medina and his supporters were
advised by attorneys to wait until the re-entry case was over to address Mr. Medina's
immigration problems. Affidavit of Petitioner, if 13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr.

if 5; and

Affidavit of Shelly Roberts if 5. Within two months of Mr. Medina's sentencing in federal court,
they discovered that the Payette conviction was the problem and undertook finding counsel to file
a post-conviction attorney. Affidavit of Petitioner, ir 13; Affidavit of Ernesto Medina, Jr. if 6-7;
and Affidavit of Shelly Roberts ii 6-7. Counsel filed that petition less than two months later
notwithstanding extreme difficulties communicating with Mr. Medina.

17
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Mr. Medina has presented an issue of fact as to whether he brought the instant claim
within a reasonable time following its discovery. Accordingly, the Court should deny the state's
motion for summary dismissal.

III. CONCLUSION
Padilla did not announce a new rule of law under Teague and the case is therefore

retroactively applicable to Mr. Medina's case. Further, Idaho had unreasonably applied
Strickland and Hill in drawing a distinction between collateral and direct consequences and Mr.

Medina's post-conviction petition would have been erroneously denied if timely filed.
Therefore, he must be provided with a reasonable opportunity to present his claim now that Idaho
has been conected. Mr. Medina also has presented an issue of fact establishing that he brought
his post-conviction action within a reasonable time of discovering the basis of his claim.
Accordingly, the state's motion for summaryt?jsposition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

_7_ day of December, 2011.
cKAY & BARTLETT LLP

By~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Robyn Fyffe
Attorneys for Petitioner
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
day of December, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be:
mailed

~
hand delivered
to:
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CV-2011-319
AFFIDAVIT OF SHELLY
ROBERTS

)
)

Respondent.

I, Shelly Roberts, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says:
1. I am over the age of eighteen and make the following statements from personal
knowledge.
2. I was a co-worker of the Petitioner in this case, Ernesto Medina, and have been a longtime friend of Ernesto and his family. Following Mr. Medina's arrest by immigration in
September, 2010, he was taken to the Elmore County Jail in Mountain Home. I did not
understand why Mr. Medina had been arrested or what was required to assist him. Mr. Medina's
son, Junior, and I contacted a lawyer in Boise, Idaho by the name of Ernest Hoidal to see if he
1 •
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could represent Mr. Medina. Mr. Hoidal was provided payment and we understood that he
would tell us within four hours whether he could assist Mr. Medina. However, when Mr. Hoidal
arrived at the jail to see Mr. Medina, he was told that he would need to return with paperwork.
By the time Mr. Hoidal returned to the jail with the paperwork the next day, Mr. Medina had
already been moved from Elmore County to Multnomah County in Portland, Oregon.
3. After Mr. Medina contacted me to get information regarding his case, we stopped
dealing with Mr. Hoidal and contacted an attorney in Portland, David Shomloo, on Mr. Hoidal' s
recommendation. By the time we found an attorney, Mr. Medina was moved to Tacoma,
Washington. Because the Tacoma facility was an immigration facility, we looked for an
immigration lawyer to see Mr. Medina in Tacoma. We found a local lawyer that would often
visit the facility to speak with other clients. However, this attorney informed us that Mr. Medina
needed a criminal lawyer for his case.
4. Mr. Medina was then moved back to Portland and we again contacted Mr. Shomloo.
We came to understand that Mr. Medina was charged with illegally re-entering the country
because there was a problem with his immigration status. Mr. Shomloo was hesitant to take Mr.
Medina's case because it was very complicated. Ultimately, Mr. Shomloo agreed to help. We
were then informed that an attorney from the federal defender's office had been appointed to
represent Mr. Medina.
5. Mr. Shomloo offered to assist the federal defender however, the federal defender
declined. Mr. Shomloo informed us that we needed to wait until the federal criminal case was
complete in order for him to assist Mr. Medina with his immigration case.
6. In December, 2010, Mr. Medina was sent to the federal prison in Sheridan, Oregon to
2 •
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serve his sentence. In late January, 2011, Mr. Shomloo told us that the problem with Mr.
Medina's immigration status was a result of an old conviction in Idaho. Mr. Shomloo instructed
us to find a post-conviction attorney in Idaho in order to help Mr. Medina.
7. We then searched on the internet for post conviction lawyers in Idaho and after
multiple calls, we were given the number of Nevin, Benjamin, Mckay & Bartlett LLP. In early
February, 2011, we met with Robyn Fyffe and retained her services to represent Mr. Medina in a
post conviction case. Due to communication difficulties with Mr. Shomloo, we also retained
Maria Andrade in Idaho to represent Mr. Medina in his immigration matters. Mr. Medina has
been incarcerated in Tacoma, Washington as a result of the immigration hold since finishing his
sentence in Sheridan in March of 2011. Although bail was set in July, we have not been able to
afford Mr. Medina's release.
8. Throughout this ordeal, Junior and I have been working together to assist Mr. Medina
in getting information to and from the lawyers. Communication with both attorneys and Mr.
Medina has been difficult - a situation aggravated by Mr. Medina's multiple moves from various
detention facilities. We relied on the advice of attorneys that we needed to wait until the re-entry
case was finished in order to address Mr. Medina's immigration problem. As soon as we
discovered that the immigration problem was caused by the Idaho conviction, we searched for an
attorney who could file a post-conviction action.
9. Based on multiple conversations with Mr. Medina concerning his immigration status
over the years before his arrest, I do not believe Mr. Medina understood that the fact he had been
returned to Mexico by immigration officials was a true "deportation" because his green card and
driver's license were left in his possession. I also do not believe that Mr. Medina has ever
3 •

AFFIDAVIT OF SHELLY ROBERTS

/9.0

understood the effect the Idaho conviction had on his immigration papers.
This ends my affidavit.

~~
lheHyRObrts
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
day of December, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be:
mailed
-~--

faxed

hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661

Robyn Fyffe
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ANNE-MARIE KELSO
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1130 Third Avenue North
Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
(208) 642-6096
Fax: (208) 642-6099

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV 2011-319

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

COMES NOW, Anne-Marie Kelso, and, submits this supplemental brief.
In the Petitioners' supplemental memorandum, he argues that the court should hear this
matter for two reasons: 1) equitable tolling applies and 2) the alleged retroactivity of Padilla v.
Kentucky 130 S,Ct. 1473 (2010).

The Petitioner is not entitled to Equitable Tolling
As noted in the State's original brief, in Idaho, equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations for filing a post-conviction relief petition has only been recognized: (1) where the
petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal
representation or access to Idaho legal materials; and (2) where mental disease and/or
psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier
pursuing challenges to his conviction. See Leer v. State 148 Idaho 113 (2009); Shultz v. State 151
Supplemental Brief 1

Idaho 383 (2011); Amboh v. State 149 Idaho 650 (2010). The Petitioner argues he was in fact
incarcerated out of state. Further, petitioner argues that he brought the motion timely. However,
the issue of equitable tolling is not contingent upon a reasonable time for filing. Rather, there are
two instances, as noted, where equitable tolling applies. Petitioner wants this Court to determine
that he was incarcerated out of state when he realized he had immigration issues. However,
again as noted in the original brief, the Petitioner has already admitted that he knew in 2000 that
he had immigrations issues. Furthermore, from the time Padilla was decided, in March 2010 to
the time the Defendant was arrest, in September 2010, Petitioner was not incarcerated anywhere.
Therefore, he fails to satisfy the criteria for equitable tolling.
The Holding Of Padilla Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For Retroactive Application 1
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings in which,
like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v.
State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)). Where the petitioner alleges
entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to prevail, the petitioner
"must establish that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in
prejudice to the claimant." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). "There is a strong presumption
that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance and the defendant
bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id. (citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989)). In addition,
it is well-established that"[ a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

1 The following was taken from, in part, from the brief of the Idaho Attorney General in HASAN ICANOVIC vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, Supreme Court Case No. 38477, submitted on or about November 8, 2011.
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made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perspective at the time." Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ellipses original)).
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must "show a reasonable probability that the
outcome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148 Idaho at
570, 225 P.3d at 703 (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998)). "'A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in
relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and
citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances."
Padilla at 1485 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Medina bases a large part of the supplemental brief arguing for the retro activity of Padilla.
Because the holding of Padilla does not meet the applicable test for retroactive application, Medina
is not entitled to relief as a matter oflaw.
1.

Overview of Padilla v. Kentucky

In Padilla, the Court considered whether defense counsel has an obligation to advise his client
that a guilty plea would make him subject to automatic deportation. Padilla pled guilty to drug
trafficking in Kentucky state court and, although a lawful permanent resident of the United States, he
was subject to removal because of his drug conviction. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. Padilla sought
post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Padilla argued he entered his
guilty plea in reliance on his counsel's erroneous advice that the plea would not affect his
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immigration status. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla post-conviction reliefand held
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not protect him from
erroneous advice regarding the collateral consequences of a conviction such as deportation or
removal. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. It found "constitutionally competent
counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to
automatic deportation." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. The Court noted that many state and federal
courts had concluded that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
was limited to advice about the direct consequences of a guilty plea, and did not extend to
information regarding collateral consequences. Id. at 1481. However, it nonetheless concluded that
"advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel." Id. at 1482. The Court explained that it had "never applied a distinction between
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' required under Strickland." Id. at 1481. It declined to consider the appropriateness of the
direct/collateral distinction generally and found such a distinction to be "ill-suited to evaluating a

Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation." Id. at 1481-82.
The Court based its conclusion on the "unique nature" of deportation, and specifically
focused on its severity as a penalty and its close relationship to the criminal process. Id. at 1481.
The Court discussed recent changes in federal immigration law and explained that these changes
further "enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation" by making "removal nearly
an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders." Id. at 14 78-81. The Court held that
"deportation is an integral part ... of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes" and cannot be "divorce[ d] ... from the conviction." Id. at 1480-81.
The Court concluded that Strickland thus applied to Padilla's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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The Court next considered whether Padilla established the first Strickland prong - whether
his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. In determining the
reasonableness of Padilla's attorney's representation, the Court looked to the prevailing professional
norms set forth by the American Bar Association and numerous other authorities. Id. at 1482, 1485.
The Court found that, dating back to the mid- l 990s, those authorities have been in agreement that
counsel must advise his client regarding the risks of deportation. Id. It explained that if Padilla's
counsel consulted the removal statutes he would have easily determined that Padilla's guilty plea
would make his removal virtually mandatory and that his attorney was ineffective for failing to do
so. Id at 1483. The Court held, "when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this
case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear." Id.
The Court also noted that, although in Padilla's case the immigration consequences were
clear, in some situations the immigration consequences are unclear. Id. In those situations, defense
counsel still has a duty to advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may have negative
immigration consequences. Id. Thus, the Court held that the seriousness and severity of deportation
as a consequence of a guilty plea make it critical that defense counsel "inform her client whether his
plea carries a risk of deportation." Id. at 1486.

I II I I
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2.

Padilla Created A New Rule2

In collateral proceedings such as post-conviction "Idaho courts must independently review
requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles oflaw under the Teague [v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989)] standard." Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 136, 233 P.3d 61, 67 (2010).
Under Teague, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court announcing a new rule apply to
all criminal cases still pending on direct review. The new rule, however, only applies
to final convictions in limited circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply
retroactively because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces punishment that the
law cannot impose upon him. New procedural rules generally do not apply
retroactively because they do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the
law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted
with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. This is a
more speculative connection to innocence and, therefore, retroactivity is only given to
a small set of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.
Id. at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). See also Kriebel v. State, 148
Idaho 188, 191, 219 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Ct. App. 2009)("If a case is deemed to have announced anew
rule, it will apply retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the

2 Courts are split as to whether Padilla announced a new rule and whether the rule should be given
retroactive effect. To date, three federal circuit courts have addressed the issue, and the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits have concluded that Padilla is a new rule not entitled to retroactive effect. See
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (ih Cir. 2011); United States v. Chang Hong, --F.3d--, 2011
WL 3805763 (10 1h Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit has found that Padilla simply applied the old
Strickland rule, such that it was retroactively applicable on collateral review. United States v.
Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640-42 (3rd Cir. 2011). Federal district courts are likewise split. Compare
Doan v. United States, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2011 WL 116811 at *3 (E.D.Va. 201 l)(Padilla states a new
rule); United States v. Hough, 2010 WL 5250996 at *3-4 (D.N.J. 2010) (same); United States v.
Perez, 2010 WL 4643033 at *2 (D.Neb. 2010) (same) with Marroquin v. United States, 2011 WL
488985 at *2 (S.D.Tex. 2011) (Padilla does not state a new rule); Luna v. United States, 2010 WL
4868062 at *3-4 (S.D.Cal. 2010) (same); United States v. Shafeek, 2010 WL 3789747 at *3
(E.D.Mich. 2010) (same); Martin v. United States, 2010 WL 3463949 at *3 (C.D.Ill. 2010) (same);
Al Kokabani v. United States, 2010 WL 3941836 at *4-6 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (same); United States v.
Millan, 2010 WL 2557699 at *1 (N.D.Fla. 2010) (same). The state submits the reasoning of the
courts that have concluded Padilla created a new rule is more persuasive, particularly in light of the
applicable legal test for determining whether a new rule has been created as discussed irifra.
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rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceedings." (internal quotations omitted)).
Padilla created a new rule. A rule is new when it was not "dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).
A rule is old if a "court considering the defendant's claim at the time his conviction became final
would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by
the Constitution." O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (quotation and brackets omitted).
The inquiry is whether Padilla's outcome was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). In determining whether the outcome of a case was
susceptible to reasonable debate, the Supreme Court has looked to both the views expressed in the
opinion itself and lower court decisions. "If the lower courts were split on the issue, the Court has
concluded that the outcome of the case was susceptible to reasonable debate." Chaidez v. United
States, 655 F.3d 384, 2011WL3705173 at *4 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. In
addition, "[l]ack of unanimity on the Court in deciding a particular case supports the conclusion that
the case announced a new rule." Chaidez at *4 (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 414-15, 124
S.Ct. 2504 (2004)).

a.

Lower Court Split

Prior to Padilla, lower courts were split as to whether an attorney must advise his clients of
deportation consequences. In Chaidez, the Seventh Circuit explained:
Prior to Padilla, the lower federal courts, including at least nine Courts of
Appeals, had uniformly held that the Sixth Amendment did not require counsel to
provide advice concerning any collateral (as opposed to direct) consequences of a
guilty plea. Courts in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia had reached
this same conclusion. Such rare unanimity among the lower courts is compelling
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evidence that reasonable jurists reading the Supreme Court's precedents in April
2004 could have disagreed about the outcome of Padilla.
Chaidez at *5 (internal citations and quotes omitted). It continued:
We acknowledge that the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily
mean a rule is new. But, in our view, an objective reading of the relevant cases
demonstrates that Padilla was not dictated by precedent. It is true that, unlike so
many lower courts, the Supreme Court has never applied a distinction between direct
and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable
professional assistance as required under Strickland. As such, prior to Padilla, the
Court had not foreclosed the possibility that advice regarding collateral consequences
of a guilty plea could be constitutionally required. But neither had the Court required
defense counsel to provide advice regarding consequences collateral to the criminal
prosecution at issue.
Id. at *6 (internal citations and quotes omitted).
In Idaho, like in the majority of jurisdictions, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel did not require counsel to provide advice concerning collateral consequences of
a guilty plea. See Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285, 32 P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001). The risk
of deportation or other impacts on immigration status was generally considered a collateral
consequence, albeit a "very significant consequence" for a defendant. State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145
Idaho 400, 402, 179 P.3d 363, 365 (Ct. App. 2008); Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796-97, 874
P.2d 603, 607-608 (Ct. App. 1994). Because the risk of deportation was considered a collateral
consequence, and an attorney had no duty to advise his clients of collateral consequences, prior to
Padilla an Idaho attorney had no obligation to advise his clients of possible deportation consequences
stemming from their guilty pleas. That Idaho followed the majority rule in holding that an attorney
did not generally need to advise defendants of deportation consequences lends support to the
argument that the outcome of Padilla was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."
b.

Lack Of Supreme Court Unanimity

Also weighing in favor of a conclusion that Padilla created a new rule is the lack of
unanimity on the Court in the Padilla case. See Chaidez at *4. Justice Stevens delivered the
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majority opinion in Padilla, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. Justice
Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Roberts joined. Justice Scalia
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. As explained by the Seventh Circuit, this
lack of unanimity supports the conclusion that Padilla announced a new rule:
Statements in the concurrence leave no doubt that Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts considered Padilla to be groundbreaking. See 130 S.Ct. at 1488, 1491, 1492
(referring to the majority's holding as a "dramatic departure from precedent," "a
major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law," and a "dramatic expansion of the scope of
criminal defense counsel's duties under the Sixth Amendment"). And the two
dissenting Justices, who expressed the view that the majority's extension of the
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence lacked "basis in text or principle," certainly
did not see Padilla as dictated by precedent. 130 S.Ct. at 1495 (Scalie, J.,
dissenting). See also Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236-37, 110 S.Ct. 2822. Even the majority
suggested that the rule it announced was not dictated by precedent, stating that while
Padilla's claim "follow[ ed] from" its decision applying Strickland to advice
regarding guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d.
203 (1985), Hill "does not control the question before us." Id. at 1485 n. 12.
Chaidez at *4 (emphasis original). The Chaidez Court continued:
It seems evident from Supreme Court precedent that Padilla cannot be an old rule
simply because existing case law "inform[ed], or even control[led] or govern[ed],"
the analysis. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257. Nor will the rule of Padilla be
deemed old because precedent lent "general support" to the rule it established,
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236, 110 S.Ct. 2822, or because it represents "the most
reasonable ... interpretation of general law," Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,
538, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997). Padilla can only be considered an old
rule if Supreme Court precedent "compel[led] the result. Safjle, 494 U.S. at 490,
110 S.Ct. 1257. The majority's characterization of Hill suggests that it did not
understand the rule set forth in Padilla to be dictated by precedent.

Id. (emphasis original). Thus, both the lack of unanimity between members of the Supreme Court
and the split among lower courts prior to Padilla support the conclusion that Padilla created a new
rule.
3.

Padilla Does Not Meet Either Of The Exceptions To The Retroactivity Bar

A new rule will apply retroactively to a final conviction only under limited circumstances.
Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). "A new rule applies retroactively in collateral
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proceedings only if (1) the rule is substantive, or (2) the rule is a watershed rule of criminal
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings." Whorton
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quotation and alteration omitted). New substantive rules
generally apply retroactively because they "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot
impose upon him." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (citing Schiro, 542 U.S. at 352). New
procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively because "[t]hey do not produce a class of
persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise." Id.
(alteration in original). The Rhoades Court explained:
This is a more speculative connection to innocence and, therefore, retroactivity is
only given to a small set of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicated the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings. The procedural rule
must be one without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished.
Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
A substantive rule is one that "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law
punishes." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (citing Schiro, 542 U.S. at 353). A procedural
rule "regulate[s] only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability." Id. (emphasis in
original). The rule in Padilla "regulates the manner in which a defendant arrives at the decision to
plead guilty." United States v. Chang Hong, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 3805763 at *8 (10 1h Cir. 2011). An
individual who knows the full immigration consequences of a guilty plea may choose instead to
plead not guilty. As such, Padilla created a procedural rule and the retroactivity exception for
substantive rules does not apply. Id.
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A procedural rule is only given retroactive effect if the new rule is a watershed rule.
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two requirements.
First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an
inaccurate conviction. Second, the rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.
Bockting, 549 U.S. at 418 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Application of this standard shows that Padilla's rule is not "watershed." The Tenth Circuit
explained:

Padilla does not concern the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding,
but instead relates to the deportation consequences of a defendant's guilty plea. The
rule does not affect the determination of a defendant's guilt and only governs what
advice defense counsel must render when his noncitizen client contemplates a plea
bargain. Padilla would only be at issue in cases where the defendant admits guilt and
pleads guilty. In such situations, because the defendant's guilt is established through
his own admission - with all the strictures of a Rule 11 plea colloquy - Padilla is
simply not germane to concerns about the risks of inaccurate convictions or
fundamental procedural fairness.
Chang Hong at *9.
Medina cannot establish that there was "large risk of an inaccurate conviction" under the
rubric oflaw prior to Padilla. Likewise, having counsel's advice on immigration consequences does
not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding." Indeed, having that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision
whether to plead guilty or not. For these reasons, the new rule created in Padilla does not fit either of
the retroactivity exceptions, and Padilla should not be applied retroactively in collateral proceedings.
Based thereon, it is respectively re uested that Medina's Petition be summarily
dismissed.

DATED this
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"lD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Payette County, Idaho

:3 2011

---P.M.

BETTY J. DRESSEN

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
)
)
)

ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,

CASE NO. CV-2011-319

)

vs.

)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER

Ernesto G. Medina, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says:
1. That I am the Petitioner in the above-titled case.
2. I re-affirm the truth of those statements in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
("Petition"), which are within my personal knowledge. Specifically, I re-affirm Paragraphs 8-31.
3. As described in the Petition, I lawfully emigrated to the United States in 1986 and became a
legal permanent resident in 1990. My wife, Luz, and our growing family lived in the Ontario, Oregon
area since coming to the United States. Keeping my green card and being able to continue caring for my
wife and four children in the Ontario area has been - and is - the most important aspect of my life. I
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knew that having a clean criminal record was an important part of keeping my green card and was very
proud of the fact that in all the years I had been in this country, I had only received a ticket for driving
without a seatbelt in 1990.
4. One day in 1995, I agreed to give a ride to a person I knew named Roberto, who was married
to my niece. We went to a store and I bought a drink. On my way to Ontario, I was stopped and
arrested. I had no idea what was going on and I thought perhaps they thought I had not paid for my
drink. I later found out I was being accused of delivering drugs.
5. I could not afford to bond out and my wife became very mentally ill. She was unable to care
for our children and was taken to the hospital. A friend finally paid for my bond. The people that
worked in the hospital and for Health and Welfare wanted my wife to go to a place for the mentally ill in
Pendleton, Oregon, but I convinced them to put her into my care instead. My wife saw doctors who treat
mental illness and gave her medicine but it did not do her any good.
6. My charges were dismissed. I was told that there had been an error.
7. My wife's condition continued to be very bad and we went to Mexico to see if a doctor there
could help her. We drove from Ontario to Colima, Mexico, where Luz saw a doctor who gave her
medicine. After two months, we returned to Ontario and she continued her treatment with the doctors
there.
8. I obtained work at the Amour meat packing plant in Nampa. One day I was called to the
office and arrested. I had no idea why. My attorney, David Posey, told me that I was being accused of
delivering drugs again and I told him that they were confused and there must be a mistake.
9. I desperately wanted out of jail so that I could help my wife, who continued to be very ill and
had a great deal of difficulty coping with my incarceration. Mr. Posey told me that ifl pled guilty, I

2 •

AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER

/_glo

could get out of jail and I would have to serve an additional 22 days in jail during which I would be
allowed to leave during the day to work. As also described in the Petition, I asked Mr. Posey whether
pleading guilty would effect my immigration papers. As I have said, I had a very clean record and
keeping my papers and green card was the most important thing to me. Mr. Posey told me that he was
sure I would not have problems with my papers if I pied guilty. Mr. Posey told me that in three months,
he would submit a request to clear my record and that it would then be clean again. Mr. Posey assured
me several times that there would be no problem with my papers if I pied guilty. I relied on this advice
in accepting the plea deal described in the Petition. I was not guilty of delivery of drugs but since Mr.
Posey told me there would be no problem with my papers and my record and my wife was very sick, I
decided the best thing to do was to plead guilty.
I 0. After reporting to serve my sentence, I spent six days sleeping in the jail and leaving at 5:00
a.m. and returning at 10 p.m. The next day, I was not allowed to leave because immigration had come
for me. I said there was a mistake because Mr. Posey had said there would be no problem. I was ·not
allowed to call Mr. Posey before immigration came for me.
11. I spent approximately three months in a detention facility in Arizona, during which time I
went to an immigration court approximately two times. I did not have an attorney, there were a lot of
people and the officials talked very fact. I did not understand what happened. I was taken to the border
in a vehicle with other people and sent across the border. Immigration had taken the green cards and
licenses of other people who I know who were deported. I thought perhaps there was a mistake after all
and that my immigration papers were still good. This belief was re-affirmed when I presented the green
card at the border and was permitted to enter the United States.
12. I returned to the Ontario area and continued working and supporting my family. Then one
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day in September, 2010, I was arrested at work. At first I thought perhaps I was arrested because I had
not renewed my green card. I spent four or five days in Mountain Home and was then taken to
Pendeleton, Oregon, where I stayed only about forty minutes. I spent a night in The Dalles, Oregon, and
then a few hours in Portland, Oregon. I was then taken to Tacoma, Washington, where I stayed four
days and then to Sheridan, Oregon, where I remained for 167 days. I came to understand that I had been
charged with illegally re-entering the United States.
13. Finally, in January, 2011, I was told that the problem with my immigration papers was the
conviction from Payette, Idaho, and that I needed to find an attorney to do a post-conviction petition in
Idaho. The Idaho attorneys who were hired to help me, Ms. Fyffe and Maria Andrade, explained to me
that the Idaho conviction is an "aggravated felony" that means my green card can never be renewed.
Although I began to suspect there was a problem with my green card before my arrest, I never
understood that the advice Mr. Posey gave me was completely false.
This ends my affidavit.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO

before ~-'71:_of

JJ""-"-'"" 4-

Notary Public for the State of Washington
Residing at: ------'-------'---'-My commission expires: _ _ _ __
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STATEMENT OF COUNSEL
STATE OF IDAHO
SS.

COUNTY OF ADA
I, Robyn Fyffe, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say:
1.

That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.

2.

That I am counsel of record for the Petitioner in the above-captioned case.

3.

That I am conversant in the Spanish language.

4.

Mr. Medina is presently being detained in the Northwest Detention Facility in Tacoma,
Washington. It takes several weeks to receive a document that I send to Mr. Medina to be
reviewed and notarized.

5.

I drafted the instant Affidavit based on information that Mr. Medina provided to me in a
letter written in Spanish. I thereafter reviewed the contents of this Affidavit with Mr.
Medina by telephone and he affirmed that the contents therein are true and correct.

6.

I mailed the foregoing Affidavit in order to obtain Mr. Medina's notarized signature.
However, I anticipate it will be several weeks before the signed Affidavit arrives via U.S.
mail.

7.
I wil I file the notarized Affidavit

up~_,_~re'-c-e~i"'-------------
Robyn Fyffe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thisZ °Zuay of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be:

,~iled
faxed
hand delivered
to:

Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1130 3rd Ave North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661

Robyn-F)rffe
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

**********
THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
COURT REPORTER: Leda Waddle
DATE: January 6, 2012

Ernesto Gutierrez Medina,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2011-0000319
Vs.

Court Minutes
Time: 1:38-1:50 p.m.
Courtroom #1

State of Idaho,
Defendant.

This being the time and place set for the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, present before the Honorable Susan E. Wiebe were Robyn
Fyffe attorney on behalf of the plaintiff and Anne Marie Kelso,
prosecuting attorney on behalf of the State.
Ms. Fyffe presented argument.
Ms. Kelso replied.
The Court gave ruling and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
The State was ordered to prepare the appropriate order.
Court was adjourned.
SUSAN E. WIEBE
Betty

Clerk

BY:

Court Minutes page-1-

,~,
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This matter came on for hearing on the Respondent's Motion for Summary
Dismissal on the 61h day of January, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. Based upon the evidence and
argument presented, the Respondent's Motion is GRANTED and this matter is hereby

DISMISSED.
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which
execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
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ERNESTO GUTIERREZ IvfEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
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CASE NO. CV-2011-319

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Ernesto Medina, through his attorney Robyn Fyffe, asks the Court to reconsider its order
summarily dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely. This Motion is brought
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B), which allows the Court to reconsider any
interlocutory order upon a motion made within fourteen days after the entry of the final judgment, and is
supported by the contemporaneously filed memorandum of counsel.
Respectfully submitted

thid7 day of January, 2012.
cKAY & BARTLETT LLP
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB# 7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

BETTY J. DRESSEN

303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ERNESTO GUTIERREZ MEDINA,
Petitioner,

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-2011-319

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2012, the Court granted the state's motion to dismiss Mr. Medina's petition

for post-conviction relief as untimely and entered final judgment on the state's behalf on January
13. 2012. Relying on federal circuit precedent, the Court determined that Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) announced a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and that

Mr. Medina was therefore not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations or the
benefit of the Padilla decision.
As described more fuHy below, the Court's application of the Teague standard was

contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's mandate that Idaho courts independently review requests
• MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of law. The Court should therefore
reconsider the dismissal of Mr. Medina's petition and schedule an evidentiary hearing.

H. ARGUMENT
Padilla's holding falls within the confines of prior United States Supreme Court
precedent and is therefore a retroactively applicable "old rule" under the Teague doctrine.
Further, the limitation period for Mr. Medina to file his post-conviction relief petition did not
begin to run until Padilla was announced because Padilla corrected Idaho's unreasonable
understanding of the scope of counsel's duties for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and tolling
is necessary in order to provide Mr. Medina with a meaningful opportunity to present his claim.
Even if Padilla announced a new rule under Teague, the principles underlying that rule are of
such significant import that fundamental fairness requires that the opinion be given retroactive
effect and that the statute of limitation begin to run anew when the opinion was announced.
Because Mr. Medina filed his petition within one year of Padilla, it was timely and the Court
should deny the state's motion to dismiss.
In determining otherwise, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in United

States v. Chang Hong, Dock. No. 10-6294, _F.3d __, 2011 WL 3805763, 5 (10th Cir.
2011). This wholesale adoption of federal circuit precedent was contrary to Rhoades v. State,
149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010), which requires Idaho courts to apply the Teague doctrine
independently of federal jurisprudence and consistent with considerations unique to our state.
Moreover, the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our jurisprudence dictate that

Padilla is a retroactively applicable old rule. Even if a new rule, concerns including our state's
expansive right to counsel and salient differences between co1Jateral review under the UP CPA
2
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and federal habeas establish that the Padilla opinion announced a watershed rule. This Court
should therefore reconsider the dismissal of this action, set aside the judgment and set the matter

for an evidentiary hearing.
A.

Padilla is an Old Rule Under the Modified Teague Approach Adopted by Rhoades

Although the Rhoades Court adopted the Teague approach to determine whether United
States Supreme Court decisions should be given retroactive effect, it noted that federal courts

have "strictly interpreted Teague to avoid excessive interference by federal habeas courts in state
criminal convictions that have become final." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70.
Because "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity when interpreting whether a
decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of applying Teague," Idaho courts need not

"blindly foJlow" the United States Supreme Court's view of what constitutes a new ru]e or
whether a new rule is a watershed rule. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70, citing
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). Accordingly, Rhoades held that:

The decisions of the courts of this state whether to give retroactive effect to a rule
oflaw should reflect independent judgment, based upon the concerns of this Court
and the "uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing
jurisprudence." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472, 20 P.3d 5, 8 (2001) (noting
that when this Court has found that the Idaho Constitution provides greater
protection than the U.S. Constitution, it has done so, .. on the uniqueness of our
state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence').
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70.

In adopting Chang Hong, this Court did not analyze whether the Tenth Circuit's opinion
reflected the concerns unique to Idaho. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit was largely persuaded that
Padilla was a "new" rule because many jurisdictions - including its own- had relied on the

collateral versus direct consequence distinction. Conversely, the Idaho Supreme Court does not
3
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treat the fact that the newly announced decision ovenules prior precedent as dispositive in
determining whether the decision articulates a new rule or an old rule applied to a new set of
facts. For example, in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) the Idaho
Supreme Court found that it had clarified its standard of review while adhering to the historic
principles underlying Idaho's harm]ess error and fundamental error doctrines and had not
announced a new rule even though the opinion itself overruled prior case law. Id. at 227-228.
Given that Padilla clearly applies long-standing principles concerning the right to
effective assistance of counsel, there is little to lend itself to the conclusion that the opinion
announced a new rule other than the number of lower court decisions it overruled. Minnesota which applies a similar retroactivity analysis to that adopted by our Supreme Court in Rhoades rejected the "temptation" to conclude that Padilla announced a new rule because the opinion
effectively overruled the "collateral consequences" label that many state and federal courts have
given to the risk of deportation. Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 569-570 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011); see also Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 136, 233 P.3d at 67 (adopting the Teague standard and
following "the lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court" by holding "that Idaho courts must
independently review requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of law
under the Teague standard". The Campos Court reasoned that "'the rule of criminal procedure at
issue embodies the constitutional entitlement to effective representation," which is examined
under Strickland, and "a detense attorney's duty to properly advise his client before a guilty plea
is hardly new." Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 570. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of precedent
relying on the collateral consequences label, the Campos Court held:

4
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Given (1) the procedural posture of Padilla (a collateral attack on a guilty plea);
(2) the clear references in the opinion to its application to collateral proceedings
attacking guilty pleas; (3) the analysis under long-standing principles of the right
to effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the absence of any mention of
retroactivity, the conclusion that the opinion does not announce a new rule of
criminal procedure seems self-evident to this court. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at
- - , 130 S.Ct. at 1478 (stating "[i]n this postconviction proceeding ... ");
1485-86 (discussing "nature of relief secured by a successful collateral chaHenge
to a guilty plea" and "collateral challenge to a conviction").
Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 570; see also Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903 (Mass.

2011) (noting that Padilla effectively changed the law in nine circuits but reasoning that the mere
existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new and holding that the
Padilla analysis was "the definitive application of an established constitutional standard on a

case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving professional nonns ... to new facts").
Like Minnesota, Idaho's unique jurisprudence recognizes the intimate relation between a
guilty plea in a criminal case and the immigration consequences that may flow therefrom. The
Idaho Supreme Court amended LC.R. 11 in 2007 to require that district courts "inform all
defendants that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making
of factual admissions could have consequences of deportation or removal, inability to obtain
legal citizenship in the United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship."
I.C.R. 11 (d)(l ). Idaho's establishment of this requirement as part of the entry of plea process
pre-dates the issuance of the Padilla Opinion and reflects our state's judgment as to the integral
relation between criminal guilty pleas and the immigration consequences flowing therefrom. See

also Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 569-570 (recognizing the pre-existing requirement for a trfal court
to advise a defendant regarding potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea as an

5
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indicator that the Padilla opinion was not a "'new rule" under Minnesota's independent Teague
analysis).
Notwithstanding Idaho's categorization of immigration consequences of "collateral," our
Court of Appeals has recognized the intimate connection between a guilty plea and the resulting
deportation consequences. See State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 402, 179 P.3d 363, 365
(Ct. App. 2008). In State v. Tinoco-Perez, the Court indicated:
Although the risk of deportation or other impact on immigration status is
generally considered a "collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction, it is
nevertheless a very significant consequence for the defendant. Indeed, for many
non-citizens, any term of imprisonment imposed by the court will be quite
secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on the defendant's life and
future. Therefore, the effect on immigration status is an appropriate consideration
for the trial court in fashioning a sentence or considering Rule 35 relief.

Id. Idaho's recognition of the critical importance of immigration consequences to guilty pleas for
non citizen defendants suggests that our state should recognize that the rule in Padilla is not
'"new."
The weight Idaho courts assign to the standards articulated by the American Bar
Association (ABA) for "The Defense Function" to measure contemporary standards for
competency of counsel also sets our state apart. In discussing the right to competent counsel
under Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "As a
beginning point to this inquiry, this Court recognized the American Bar Association's standards
entitled 'The Defense Function.'" Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 635 (1986). The ABA
standards for defense counsel and for the conduct of criminal proceedings have often been
referred to as "the starting point" under our Idaho State Constitution in evaluating claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279-280 (1998);
6
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Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8-9 (1975); Murphy v.

State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 411 (Ct. App. 1989);
State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1981 ).
As noted by the Padilla Court, the American Bar Association recognized the necessity of
competent defense counsel to advise a non-citizen defendant of the immigration consequences of
his or her plea prior to its Opinion. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; see also I.NS. v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001). Because Idaho places special emphasis on the American Bar
Association's promulgated standards in determining our own state constitutional right to counsel,
and because these standards recognized the necessity of competent counsel to advise a client
regarding immigration consequences of a conviction before Padilla, our unique jurisprudence
dictates that Padilla is not a "'new rule" under our independent state review for retroactivity.

In concluding that Padilla announced a new rule, the Tenth Circuit relied on the number
of courts that had applied the collateral versus direct consequence distinction to define the scope
of counsel's duties that was rejected by Padilla. This particular factor has been given little
weight in Idaho and our state's unique jurisprudence thus dictates against adopting the Tenth
Circuit's analysis. Further, Idaho has long recognized the importance of immigration
consequences of guilty pleas for non citizen defendants, notwithstanding its erroneous

application of the direct consequence limitation on the scope of counsel's duties. Accordingly,
the independent Teague analysis required by Rhoades dictates that Padilla announced a
retroactively applicable old rule.

7
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Even if Padilla Articulated a New Rule, Fundamental Fairness Requires Retroactive
Application of the Critical Constitutional Safeguard Announced in That Opinion
As noted above, the Rhoades Court followed Minnesota's lead and declined to adopt a
reflexive application of Teague with regard to the meaning of the retroactivity standards at issue.
In explaining the importance of independent review with regard to state post-conviction claims,.
the Court noted that the Teague approach has been criticized for imposing an overly broad
definition of a new rule that excluded most decisions concerning constitutional questions and for
defining the two exceptions providing for retroactive application of new rules in an extremely
narrow manner. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138, 233 P.3d at 69. The Rhoades Court also
acknowledged that the primary motivator for strict application of the Teague standards under
federal law was concerns against excessive interference by federal courts in state law
determinations and that "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity when interpreting
whether a decision pronounces a new rule oflaw for purposes of applying Teague." Id. at 139,
233 P.3d at 70. Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed throughout Rhoades that it was,

"committed to independently analyzing requests for retroactive application of newly-announced
principles of law with regard to the uniqueness of our state, our constitution, and our
long-standingjurisprudence." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 140.
Important differences between collateral review under the UPCPA and federal habeas
establish that a narrow definition of what constitutes a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure is
unwarranted. Further, Idaho's unique jurisprudence recognizes an expansive right to counsel and
that adequate advise regarding immigration consequences is the most important aspect of the
decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, independent application of the Teague exceptions to

8
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retroactive application of new rules in light of concerns unique to Idaho establisl1 that Padilla
announced a watershed rule. 1

a.

Idaho's unique jurisprudence under the Idaho Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act requires a lesser standard for watershed rules with regard f()
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such daims generally may
not be brought on direct appeal

In Idaho, ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally must be brought through a
collateral attack under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCP A), rather than being
raised on direct appeal. Therefore, the concerns of comity and finality that motivate the federal
standard for watershed rules do not apply and this Court should apply a lesser standard for what
constitutes a watershed rule than is applied under federal habeas corpus review pursuant to

Teague.
In Rhoades, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that federal courts have interpreted the
exception for watershed rules so narrowly that the "U.S. Supreme Court has found no watershed
rules in the 19 years since it adopted Teague." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138-139. This narrow
application reflects concerns specific to the federal habeas corpus context, and concomitant
concerns that the federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the finality of state court
decisions.

Teague~

489 U.S. at 308-310. Federal habeas corpus, "'is not intended as a substitute

for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing the merits of cdminal trials,' but only 'to guard against
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems."' Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292
(1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring)).

1

As discussed in Mr. Medina's supplemental memorandum in opposition to the state's
summary dismissal motion, Padilla's status as a "watershed" rule signifies that the statute of
limitations began to run anew when the opinion was announced fo addition to establishing the
opinion's retroactivity. Supplemental Memorandum, p. 4, 11-16.
9
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In fact, the exhaustion of the claim in state court is a precondition of raising any claim in federal
habeas. See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975). This requirement presupposes
that, in nearly all cases, the defendant in federal habeas proceedings will have already obtained a
ruling regarding all issues raised in habeas through the state appellate courts from which his or
her state criminal conviction arose. Id. at 486-490.
In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the unique nature of federal habeas
corpus review may lead states to apply a lesser standard of review for retroactivity and that the
unique nature of federal habeas corpus review prompted the standards underpinning the Teague
analysis. "A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the rule it established was
tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States
could provide broader relief in their own post-conviction proceedings than required by that
opinion." Danforth, 552 U.S. at 277. In fact, because the Teague retroactivity analysis was so
squarely the product of the particular concerns of the federal court in not disturbing the finality of
state law convictions, the Danforth Court further noted that these same principles of comity
might actually provide a strong basis for state courts to provide much broader application of

precedent in their own state post-conviction actions. Id. at 279-280.
Idaho's unique jurisprudence regarding colJateral challenges to criminal convictions
under the UPCPA does not share in any of the salient features of collateral challenges under
federal habeas that have motivated federal courts to apply such rigid and incredibly narrow
standards for a watershed rule for purposes ofretroactivity. This is particularly the case with
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which normally cannot be brought on direct review
and must instead be brought through post-conviction.

I0
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In Idaho, a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel either on
direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both. Matthews v. State, 122
Idaho 801, 806 (1992). While the defendant may, in theory, raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the practical reality is that resolution of such claims
almost always turns on facts outside the record on appeal, and therefore expansion of the record
through post-conviction is usuaJly required in order to properly adjudicate such claims. See, e.g.,

State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551-552 (2001); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985);
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 296 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 66-67 (Ct.
App. 2000); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-550 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 124
Idaho 374, 375-376 (Ct. App. 1993). Given this, appellate courts in Idaho routinely decline to
entertain c1aims of ineffective assistance of counsel when they are raised on direct appeal.

Elison, 135 Idaho at 551-552; Santana, 135 Idaho at 66-67; Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549-550;
]vfitchell, 124 Idaho at 376.
The requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance be raised through a petition for
post-conviction relie:f, rather than on direct appeal, is all but inescapable for claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel of the type addressed by Padilla, where the alleged deficiency relates
directly to the private consu1tation occurring between an attorney and client regarding the
decision whether to plead guilty. See Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 376 (recognizing that claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel requiring development outside the trial record typically include
fasues as to ''the adequacy of counsel's communications with the defendant"). Under Idaho's
unique post-conviction jurisprudence, such claims would necessarily need to be litigated through
collateral attacks in post-conviction, rather than on direct review, because they hinge on

11
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evidentiary matters outside the record on direct appeal. Therefore, the standards for justiciability
of such claims under Idaho law is the exact opposite as that present in federal habeas corpus rather than requiring that such claims be raised in prior proceedings in order to properly exhaust
state remedies, these issues of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised in any
proceeding other than a post-conviction petition under Idaho law.
Under requirements of exhaustion of remedies, review of any constitutional issue under
federal habeas corpus presupposes that the defendant has already had a prior opportunity to
litigate the claim at issue. Because collateral attacks in post-conviction are a defendant's first
and sole state mechanism to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel of the type described
in Padilla, such claims sufficiently implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceedings so as to
be deemed a watershed rule.

b.

Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard to our more expansive state
statutory right to counsel requires a lesser standard for watershed rules with
regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant is only
guaranteed the right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Iowa v.

Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, by statute, Idaho's unique jurisprudence provides a
right to counsel that is broader in scope than that provided solely under the federal constitution,
and therefore reflects a heightened concern for protection of the right to counsel under Idaho law
than inheres under the federal constitution.
In addition to having an independent right to counsel under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
State Constitution, criminal defendants in Idaho have extensive rights to the assistance of counsel
by virtue of statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-852. By statute in Idaho, a criminal defendant has the

12
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right to appointed counsel, "to the same extent as a person having his mvn counsel is so entitled,"
and is further entitled to the assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings under most
circumstances. See I.C. §§ 19-852, 19-4904. Idaho's general statutory right to the appointment
of counsel grants an indigent defendant the right to appointment of counsel for any proceeding in
which retained counsel would be entitled to appear. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 281-282
(1992). Moreover, this right exists, regardless of whether the right of appointed counsel to

appear in a proceeding, "comes from constitution, statute, regulation or ordinance." Id. at 282;

see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-843 (2009). That Idaho provides a more expansive
right to counsel is also reflected by the fact that Idaho recognizes the right to counsel in order to
pursue a discretionary petition for review before the Idaho Supreme Court - a right that was
expressly rejected under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court. Compare

Hernandez, 127 Idaho 687-688; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-616 (1974).
Especially noteworthy is the fact that, by Idaho's unique jurisprudence and under our
statutory laws, a defendant enjoys a statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793 (2004). This is quite significant with

regard to our state's heightened protection of the right to counsel, as the right to cotmsel in
post-conviction actions is expressly not recognized under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-556 (1987).
In fact, the Court in Finley expressly recognized that the standards for the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment are more restrictive than the very standard that is in place by statute
in Idaho. In Finley, the Court held that the federal constitution does not require the appointment
of counsel for an indigent defendant merely because an affluent defendant may retain one for the

13
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proceeding in question. Id. at 556. "The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the
legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to
reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to
present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." Id. Thus, the federal
standard for the right to counsel is expressly more limited than that afforded to defendants by
statute in Idaho - while the Sixth Amendment contains no guarantee that an indigent defendant
has the same right to the representation of counsel as the affluent one, Idaho recognizes just such
a right by operation of LC.§ 19-852. See also Young, 122 ldaho at 281-282. Moreover, the
statutory right to counsel carries the right to that counsel's assistance be effective as does the
federal right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho
685, 687 (1995) ("statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel").
That fundamental fairness which requires recognition of Padilla as a watershed rule is
illustrated by this case. Like many non-citizen defendants, the "term of imprjsonment imposed
by the court [was] quite secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on [Mr. Medina's]

life and future.'~ See Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho at 402, 179 P .3d at 365. Based entirely on his
attorney's repeated assurances that the guilty plea would not effect his immigration status, Mr.
Medina entered an Alford plea and accepted the judgment of the court notwithstanding his
assertion ofinnocence. As previously noted, if Mr. Medina had entered a guilty plea two weeks
earlier- before April l, 1997 - he could have been eligible for relief from deportation under the
prior version of the law. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326 (ho1ding that discretionary relief from
deportation available before amendments to immigration laws that became effective in April

14
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1997 remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and
who, notvvithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for that relief at the time of
their plea under the law then in effect). In electing to extend relief, the St. Cyr Court noted that
"competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides," would advise
clients regarding important immigration consequences of a guilty plea. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323
n.50. However, Mr. Medina's attorney provided affirmatively misleading advice and Mr.
Medina's Alford plea resulted in permanent exile. This situation illustrates how procedural
safeguards to prevent convictions being gained through reliance on such materially inaccurate
information is critical to the concept of ordered liberty.
Idaho's broader right to counsel, in addition to the absence of comity and similar
concerns that have resulted in a very narrow application of the Teague exceptions to retroactivity,
dictate that Idaho courts be less stringent in their wi1Iingness to recognize that a new rule is a
watershed rule of criminal procedure. Further, as discussed above, Idaho has long-recognized the
significance of adequate advice for non citizen defendants and has recognized a heightened right
to counsel. Accordingly, even if Padilla set forth a new rule under Teague, this Court should

recognize the opinion as announcing a watershed rule of criminal procedure.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reconsider its previous order summarily
dismissing Mr. Medina's petition as untimely and set this matter for an evidentiary hearing.
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofldaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY,
the Payette County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Appellant, Ernesto Gutierrez-Medina, appeals against the above
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and Order dismissing
Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, entered in the above entitled action on the 13 1h day
of January, 2012, the Honorable Susan E. Wiebe, presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l)
I.AR.

3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.
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Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Medina's petition
for post-conviction relief as untimely?
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued.
5. Transcript:
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested.
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions
of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format:
•

Oral Argument on the State's Motion to Dismiss, held on 1/6112.

6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included by Rule 28, I.AR:
•

3/23/2011 Petitioner's Request that the Court take Judicial Notice;

•

4114/2011 Verification of Petitioner;

•

9/22/2011 Affidavit of Anne Marie Kelso in Support of Respondent's
Motion for Summary Disposition;
912212011 Motion for Summary Disposition and Memorandum in
Support Thereof;

•

912212011 Notice of Hearing for Motion for Summary Disposition;
11/10/2011 Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal;
11110/2011 Affidavit of Counsel;
11/17/2011 Reply to Objection for Motion for Summary Dismissal;
11/18/2011 Court Minutes;

•

12/09/2011 Affidavit of Shelly Roberts;
12/09/2011 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion
for Summary Dismissal;

2 •

NOTICE OF APPEAL

12/09/2011 Affidavit of Petitioner;
12/09/2011 Affidavit of Kristin Brown;
12/09/2011 Affidavit of Ernesto Medina Jr.;
12/13/2011 Supplemental Brief;
12/23/2011 Affidavit of Petitioner;
1/06/2012 Court Minutes;
1/27/2012 Motion to Reconsider; and
•

1/27/2012 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider.

7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
(a) n/a.
8. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below: Leda Waddle, Court Reporter, Payette County Courthouse, 1130 3rd Ave.,
Rm. 104, Payette, ID 83661.
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because
he is indigent. A Motion to Appoint the State Appellate Public Defender on
Appeal has been filed.
(c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because he is indigent.
(d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is
no filing fee for an appeal of post-conviction petitions.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1 ), Idaho
Code).
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